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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The crisis affecting five countries in East and South-East Asia has prompted a re-evaluation
of the vulnerability of the Latin American and Caribbean countries today and the response
mechanisms they have at their command. The crisis also provides some useful lessons for
improving economic performance in the current context of globalization. The present
document examines the impact the crisis in East and South-East Asia has had and is having
on large and medium-sized Latin American countries. By way of background, the paper
considers the origins and features of the crisis. It then concentrates on the channels by which
the crisis is being transmitted and the policy responses adopted in the region. It goes on to
present projections as to the effects of the crisis on growth, foreign trade and the balance of
payments, and concludes by drawing some lessons for policy at both the national and
international levels.
It is striking just how vulnerable these Asian economies have proved, when they
enjoyed domestic price stability, solid fiscal surpluses and high savings and investment rates
and had extensively liberalized their external trade and financial markets. It seems reasonable
to conclude, in the light of this situation, that the crisis was due not to a single factor, but
rather to a set of internal and external factors.
There is general consensus that the crisis was caused, among other things, by the
rapid expansion in external credit and other short-term capital inflows, part of which served to
finance loans with longer maturities offered by local banks, loans that were not always
channelled efficiently. These financial flows entered a macroeconomic scenario of
appreciating currencies and growing balance-of-payments current account deficits. The
institutional framework was notable for deficiencies in the banking system, which led to
overinvestment in real estate in some countries and in industrial sectors and infrastructure in
others. On the production front, the competitiveness of some exports declined and a number
of foreign markets contracted, and this undercut the rate of export growth.
The spillover effects of the Asian crisis, transmitted to Latin America by the
channels of trade and finance, have affected different countries in different ways and have
been met with policy measures in the monetary, financial and trade spheres. As the second
quarter of 1998 begins, there is a feeling of modest satisfaction in the region about
government handling of the crisis and the robustness of economies. In point of fact,
speculative attacks on a number of currencies have been thwarted, downturns on stock
markets have been halted and to some extent reversed, and domestic interest rates and
external loans are gradually returning to pre-crisis levels. Nonetheless, the policies put in
place to deal with the Asian crisis and the new international context it has generated entail
costs for the region and will adversely affect its growth prospects. Of course, they are not the
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only reason why growth forecasts for 1998 have been revised downward: other factors
include unusually bad weather conditions; increased utilization of capacity hitherto
underutilized, in some countries; and, in others, the impossibility of maintaining growth rates
at 1997 levels in view of the rapid expansion in external imbalances. Reduced oil production
and a drop in oil prices are further contributing factors, and are having a major impact on the
external and fiscal accounts of some countries.
Thus, gross domestic product (GDP) is projected to grow by around 3% this year, a
decline of more than two percentage points with respect to 1997; the Asian crisis will be
responsible for around one percentage point of this decline. The value of exports is projected
to rise by 8%, in contrast to rates of over 10% in previous years; the value of imports is also
expected to fall to around 10% from the significantly higher levels recorded in 1997. The
current account deficit is projected to increase from 3.0% to 3.5% of GDP. It is important to
remember that there are processes under way with outcomes that are still unknown, which
may alter these projections. Two of the most important of these are the situation facing Japan
and the oil market.
By studying the crisis affecting East and South-East Asia and examining the channels
through which its impact has spread to Latin America, it is possible to draw a number of
conclusions and put forward some policy recommendations, at both the national and
international levels. At the national level, there is a need to act in concert in three policy
areas that complement one another: the macroeconomic, the institutional and that related to
changing production patterns and competitiveness.
In the macroeconomic sphere, a comment is in order about the policies in place prior
to the crisis. In both Asia and Latin America, the management of economic policy in
expansionary periods goes a long way towards explaining the subsequent difficulties. The
external flows generated during upswings were often used to expand public and private
spending. Such uses of external flows led many agents to run up huge debts, which then
prompted foreign banks to withdraw their loans abruptly. Policies need to be formulated that
contribute to macroeconomic stability by cutting back on spending during times of expansion
and thereby moderating declines during downturns. In countries characterized by slow or
negligible economic growth and a backlog of social problems, the right approach during
periods of expansion would seem to be to combine policies aimed at macroeconomic
stability with prudent use of some of the additional resources to resolve production
bottlenecks or finance reforms that yield high economic and social returns.
In the institutional sphere, Latin America and the Caribbean have made progress
towards improving an extremely weak banking system, a legacy of the 1980s and 1994-1995
crises and the lack of prudential supervision. However, much remains to be done. Among
other measures, a higher capital-to-assets ratio should be set for banks than the one proposed
by the Basle Committee, in view of the fact that a potential foreign exchange crisis in Latin
American countries may have a particularly pronounced adverse effect on banks’ assets.
There is also a need to tighten consolidated prudential supervision of the financial system
and to use mechanisms that discourage excessive capital inflows and reduce the proportion
of short-term flows.
The Asian crisis also brings to the fore the issue of changing production patterns and
competitiveness, for the problems in Asia are not limited to the financial sector. An old
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lesson, yet one still relevant today, concerns the need to continue diversifying the output and
especially the exports of Latin America and the Caribbean. Prices of primary commodities,
which still account for the bulk of exports of many countries in the region, remain very
volatile. And there is a corollary lesson to be drawn, namely, that the rapid changes
witnessed in global markets for non-financial goods and services mean that the progress made
by some countries in the region in terms of export growth and diversification should not be
viewed as a self-perpetuating state of affairs. Competitiveness is something that requires
constant attention.
At the international level, the existence of major shortcomings in global capital
markets points to the need for a substantial increase in the resources at the disposal of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), so that the Fund, in collaboration with other institutions
and Governments, can limit the effects of financial and foreign exchange crises in individual
countries and prevent the contagion from spreading to other emerging nations. It is also
important to ensure that such arrangements do not increase “moral hazard” by encouraging
international private investors and creditors to assume excessive risks, knowing that they will
be rescued if the situation reaches a critical point. That is why, when crises arise, these
creditors should contribute to their resolution by rolling over their loans, without increasing
interest payments or demanding government guarantees; in that way, resources of
international financial institutions and Governments can be used to finance the recovery of
ailing economies, rather than go towards paying off past debts.
Ideally, of course, such problems should be prevented from arising in the first place.
The best way to do that would be to take steps, at the global level, during periods of
excessive optimism, to moderate the flow of capital to emerging economies, thus making
such flows more sustainable. To that end, it is important to improve and supplement
international prudential supervision of large volatile flows to adapt to the new set of
circumstances. There is a need, first of all, to strengthen existing prudential supervision and
regulation of short-term international loans in developed countries. Also required is a
measure of prudential regulation of institutional investors’ portfolio investments, such as
mutual funds. This could be achieved, for example, through variable liquidity requirements
linked to a weighted average of country risk for portfolio investments in developing
countries.
It should be possible to supplement prudential supervision of global credit and
capital markets with an international tax. A small tax levied on all international transactions
denominated in foreign currencies would serve as a relatively important disincentive to very
short-term flows of speculative capital (since they would be taxed frequently), whereas the
effect on long-term flows would be negligible. Were such a tax introduced, the effect would
be to increase the autonomy of national economic authorities in managing their monetary and
foreign exchange policies.
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I. THE CRISIS IN EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA
The crisis affecting various countries of East and South-East Asia,1 coming, as it has, in the
wake of the 1992-1993 crisis of the European Monetary System and the “tequila effect” in
1994-1995, underscores the tendency of the current international climate to generate frequent,
unforeseeable disruptions, which suddenly throw stock exchanges and foreign exchange
markets into disarray and require prompt reaction by Governments and the international
community to avoid their spread. This calls for the mobilization of substantial resources and
entails high costs, especially for the developing countries, which are particularly vulnerable
to external shocks.2
The countries affected by this crisis had achieved outstanding levels of economic
growth and were held up by many as models of development to be emulated. The crisis has
forced the countries of Latin America to adopt defensive short-term policies and calls for an
assessment of its possible medium- and long-term repercussions on the patterns of
sustainable development being promoted in our region at the present time.
Since the outbreak of the crisis in mid-1997, projections for growth in the countries
of East and South-East Asia have been systematically revised downwards. For 1998, a
decline in gross domestic product (GDP) is expected in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and
Thailand, and a slowdown in growth in the rest of the subregion, especially in Malaysia and
the Philippines (see table A-1). Most of these countries have had to devalue their currencies
and to face stock exchange crashes; but currency depreciation and the economic recession
                                                          
1
 The countries considered here are the newly industrialized economies of Asia (the Chinese
provinces of Hong Kong and Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore), together with Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
2
 There is currently considerable debate about the origins of the Asian crisis and the lessons to
be drawn from it. Among the extensive literature on the subject, the following might be mentioned: Paul
Krugman, “What happened to Asia?”, January 1998; J. Sgard, L. Cardiou, M. Aglietta and A. Bénassy-
Quéré, "La crise financière en Asie", La lettre du CEPII No. 167, Paris, October 1997; International
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Washington, D.C., December 1997; Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Outlook, Paris, December 1997; Steve
Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis", March 1998; Rudiger
Dornbush, "Capital Controls: An Idea Whose Time is Gone", March 1998; Yilmaz Akyüz, The East
Asian Financial Crisis: Back to the Future?, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Geneva, January 1998; Joseph Stiglitz, The Role of International Financial Institutions in the Current
Global Economy, World Bank, Washington, D.C., February 1998; Guillermo Perry and Daniel
Lederman, Financial Vulnerability, Spillover Effects, and Contagion: Lessons from the Asian Crises
for Latin America, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 3 March 1998. (A number of these documents can
be found on the Internet.)
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suggest that there will be a rapid reversal in external imbalances equivalent to 7 percentage
points in the overall output of the five most seriously affected countries, whose current
account position should move from a deficit of -5.1% of GDP in 1996 to a surplus of 1.6%
in 1998. It is interesting to note, for purposes of comparison, that when its debt crisis
occurred, Latin America had to adjust its current account balance by about 5 percentage
points of GDP at current values between 1981 and 1984 and managed to do so despite a
sharp deterioration in the terms of trade. As happened earlier in Latin America, the
devaluations, credit crunch and recession are affecting the capacity to pay of East and South-
East Asian economic agents and are swelling the non-performing loan portfolios of some
banking systems.
That economies which  had satisfied a number of the requirements usually
considered necessary for stable development —stable domestic prices, solid fiscal surpluses,
high domestic savings and investment rates, and liberalized external trade and financial
markets (see table A-2)— should prove so vulnerable deserves some comment. The main
criticisms now advanced concerning their pre-crisis performance refer to the weakness of
their banking systems and the nature of their external debt, which consisted mainly of short-
term loans; in view of this debt, combined with a rising balance-of-payments current account
deficit, the level of reserves proved inadequate.
1. Credit expansion and foreign capital
In recent years, bank lending expanded at rates that far exceeded the already high output
growth rates (see table A-3). This expansion was especially rapid between 1993 and 1996 in
the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, and somewhat less so in the Republic of
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. Part of this expansion is attributable to the
fact that the local banking system had access to international bank credit, in addition to
already high levels of domestic savings; in fact, within three years —from June 1994 to June
1997— these loan balances soared in the Philippines, Thailand, the Republic of Korea and
Indonesia, but not in Taiwan Province of China. However, in various countries, the most
important increase in indebtedness to the foreign banking system related to borrowing by the
non-bank private sector, which accounted for around 60% of the increase in total debt in
Thailand and the Philippines, 70% in Malaysia and 80% in Indonesia (see figure 1).
In Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea, most foreign loans
continued to be channelled through the local banking system; overall in these two cases, close
to one third of indebtedness to foreign banks in 1997 was incurred by the non-bank private
sector3 (see table A-4).
                                                          
3
 In addition to bank debt, the direct issue of Eurobonds and the trade credit to which major
firms have access should be taken into account.
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Figure 1
Total credit balances of East and South-East Asian economies from the
international banking system
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Source: Bank for International Settlement, The Maturity and Sectoral Distribution of International Bank
Lending, Basle, various issues.
It should be noted that the public sector was not responsible for the external debt
problem in any of the countries under review and in fact ran a surplus.4 In any event, total
debt owed to foreign banks doubled in three years, moving from US$ 153 billion to US$ 300
                                                          
4
 Between 1994 and 1997, public sector borrowing from the foreign banking system declined
in absolute terms in all countries except the Republic of Korea, where it increased by barely US$ 600
million compared with a total increase in debt of US$ 55.4 billion.
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billion,5 much of that in the form of short-term loans, as shown in table A-4. This situation
entailed loan and foreign exchange risks, which were underestimated.
It is true that financing investment through bank loans was characteristic of these
economies6 and that recourse to external funds was encouraged, except in Singapore, by
relatively high domestic interest rates, which served to contain inflation in a context of rapid
growth. However, access to foreign capital, the more liberal and permissive financial
framework and inadequate State control led to overinvestment and overborrowing by some
industrial conglomerates, especially in the Republic of Korea, and fuelled speculative
bubbles in liquid and fixed asset markets, especially in Thailand and the Philippines. A
situation of financial vulnerability thus developed.7
Some of these patterns are not unfamiliar in the Latin American region, where drastic
deregulation of local financial systems, combined with easy access to external capital, have
led to a sharp credit expansion and overborrowing by economic agents and by the country as
a whole, especially when such expansion has occurred against a backdrop of lax supervision
and inadequate prudential regulation. In fact, some of the policy measures adopted by
Governments following the crisis of the 1980s and the Mexican crisis in late 1994 were
geared to strengthening the banking system by establishing prudential controls and improving
the quality of capital inflows into the countries. In some cases, costs were imposed on short-
term capital inflows considered speculative. These measures are highly complementary.
Events in East and South-East Asia demonstrate that, if external capital is allowed to
circulate absolutely freely, regulation of the local banking system cannot prevent
overindebtedness of the non-bank private sector, and thus the quality of local bank portfolios
is impaired. Moreover, large capital inflows tend to generate excessive credit expansion. If,
at the same time, a current account deficit develops owing to the high spending financed by
external capital,8 “deterioration of the external balance and weakening of the financial sector
are two sides of the same process of excessive capital inflows”.9
                                                          
5
 For purposes of comparison, the debt of Latin America and the Caribbean to the international
banking system increased to US$ 286 billion in September 1997.
6
 See “Dossier: Les systèmes financiers asiatiques”, Revue d’économie financière, No. 44,
Paris, December 1997.
7
 Guillermo Perry, and Daniel Lederman, referring to the factors that have contributed to this
financial vulnerability, mention the lack of transparency of the private-sector’s financial position, based
on the control structures of the business conglomerates. See Financial Vulnerability, Spillover Effects,
and Contagion: Lessons from the Asian Crises for Latin America, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 3
March 1998.
8
 The external deficits in Asia “were not led by government deficits and did not imply losses
of international reserves. Neither were they an exogenous increase of private expenditure. On the
contrary, they were due to a rise in private expenditure led by capital inflows”. See Ricardo Ffrench-
Davis, “The policy implications of the Tequila effect”, Challenge, vol. 41, No. 2, New York, March-
April 1998.
9
 See Yilmaz Akyüz, The East Asian Financial Crisis: Back to the Future?, UNCTAD,
Geneva, January 1998.
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2. Deterioration in external accounts and inadequate returns on investment
Apart from the two determining factors referred to above, on which there is some degree of
consensus, there are other factors which are not entirely unknown in our region. Chief among
them are the maintenance of a fixed rate of exchange against the dollar, a slowdown in export
growth and problems with respect to the amount and use of investment —on the one hand,
overinvestment and, on the other, concentration of investment in just a few industries and
products of uncertain long-term profitability.
One common feature in these East and South-East Asian countries was the adoption
of a foreign exchange policy which pegged the currency to the United States dollar (see figure
2).10 The advantage of this policy was to establish an informal zone of relative foreign
exchange stability among the countries of the subregion, a situation which favoured trade.
However, in view of the wide fluctuations of the European and Japanese currencies against
the dollar to which the international economy has been prone, this foreign exchange policy
has caused appreciation or depreciation of the local currencies, subjecting local producers to
substantial changes in terms of their competitiveness.
In this context, the progressive strengthening of the United States dollar since mid-
1995 has affected the competitiveness of exports from East and South-East Asia. Labour-
intensive industries, in particular, have suffered market losses due to competition from
countries like China, India and Viet Nam, with more favourable exchange rates and lower
labour costs. In addition, there has been market saturation or more sluggish growth in demand
for certain products from the subregion, such as inputs for the electronics industry, which
have dropped sharply in price; this suggests insufficient capacity to diversify the range and
improve the quality of exports. Thus exports expanded by only 5.6% in 1996, a percentage
well below the average growth rate between 1990 and 1996, which had ranked these
countries among the most dynamic with respect to trade (see table A-5). The slowdown in
exports fuelled the current account deficit in 1996-1997 (except in Singapore and Taiwan
Province of China, which posted surpluses), while foreign credit continued to expand; hence
imports did not slacken, in general, as much as would have been necessary (see figure 3).
                                                          
10
 Strictly speaking, not all the systems were identical: Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand
pegged their currencies to a basket of currencies, within which the United States dollar nevertheless
played a predominant role; the Republic of Korea and Indonesia pegged their currencies to the United
States dollar, as did Hong Kong, where a convertibility system operates. Although Taiwan Province of
China and the Philippines in theory applied a floating exchange rate system, in fact, their goal was
stability vis-à-vis the United States dollar.
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Figure 2
Exchange-rate variations between January 1994 and February 1998
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues and The
Economist, various issues.
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Figure 3
Exports and imports of the economies of East and South-East Asia
in current dollars
(yearly percentage change)
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In the long term, this episode constitutes a warning about the risks associated with
heavy reliance on exports, if not properly managed. In Latin America, too, in the early 1980s,
slower growth in the volume of exports and a fall in their value radically altered the
debt/export and interest/export ratios, and these shifts, in a situation of abundant capital
inflows, altered perceptions of the risk involved in lending to the countries of the region. Both
the Asian and the Latin American experience demonstrate the importance of continuous
monitoring of the balance of payments from the medium-term viewpoint and of establishing
stabilization funds to counteract external market fluctuations. This is all the more important
in Latin America because its exports include a large proportion of primary commodities.
Overinvestment is another explanation that has been given for the Asian crisis; it is argued that
it is difficult in the medium and long term to maintain an investment rate exceeding 30% of GDP without
losing economic efficiency,11 as exemplified by investment in real estate or big infrastructure projects
only partially utilized.12 Although high economic growth rates would not have been possible without
accelerated investment, in many cases it had become almost impossible to put the investment to
productive use. If this argument is valid, it throws doubt upon the future sustainability of growth rates
such as those seen in the Asian countries, although it may well be that these countries will be able to
increase their investment efficiency considerably.
Some observers have questioned not only the level of investment, but even more its
excessive concentration in real estate and physical infrastructure and in a limited range of
export-oriented industries and products facing market saturation, such as chemicals, steel,
semiconductors, textiles, automobiles and other consumer durables.13 Lastly, some analysts
have argued that in various Asian countries the crisis in part reflects neglect of the domestic
market.14
                                                          
11
 See RBC Dominion Securities, Global Market Themes, Asian Earthquake, 24 October
1997, and London Business School, Centre for Economic Forecasting, Economic Outlook, vol. 22, No.
2, London, February 1998.
12
 Without ruling out possible inefficiency in investment, some observers feel that one of the
current problems in certain Asian countries is precisely the inadequacy of infrastructure following many
years of rapid growth; this is thought to produce bottlenecks and increase costs. See Centre d’études
prospectives et d’informations internationales (CEPII), L’Économie mondiale, 1998, Paris, La
Découverte, 1997.
13
 See RBC Dominion Securities, op. cit.
14
 From that viewpoint, it is suggested that “for many Asian countries, the development of a
true middle class, through better distribution of the fruits of growth, is of strategic importance.
Intensifying competition among low-wage countries and the future saturation of markets in the richer
countries make the development of domestic markets a vital objective. The major Asian countries are
far from having achieved that”. See CEPII, L’Économie mondiale, 1998, op. cit., p.15.
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II. EFFECTS OF THE ASIAN CRISIS ON LATIN AMERICA
1. Channels of transmission
The effects of the ongoing Asian crisis on the Latin American countries have varied in each
phase. In July and August 1997, when the crisis caused the first currency depreciations and
depressed stock markets in Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, no significant
effects were perceptible in Latin America, with the probable exception of the price of copper,
which began to drop in July 1997.
The scenario began to change in October, when the stock market crisis took on a new
dimension, as it spread to the major Asian stock exchanges (those of Japan, Singapore,
Taiwan and Hong Kong) and caused considerable declines on stock exchanges in Europe and
the United States of America. At that point, Latin American stock markets and financial
systems began to be affected, and bond spreads widened abruptly in the countries of the
region. Some countries suffered or feared an attack on their currencies and raised domestic
interest rates. In other Latin American countries, these effects were felt only later, in the early
months of 1998. As the crisis lengthened and deepened, spreading to the Republic of Korea
towards the end of November, the effects began to be felt in commodities prices during the
last quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998.
These, in broad outline, are the trading and financial mechanisms through which the
Asian crisis has been transmitted to Latin America, with effects not only on the external and
fiscal accounts, but also on output and income; the policies adopted to counteract them have
in turn affected economic activity.
(a) Trade channels
Currency devaluation and economic recession in the Asian countries are causing
them to import less, and this is having an impact on the whole of world trade. The eight
countries of East and South-East Asia considered here represented 15% of world trade in
1996; they accounted for 31% of the increase in world imports between 1990 and 1995 and
28% of the increase in exports. Including Japan, the developed economy hardest hit by the
crisis, the percentage of world trade the region accounted for in 1996 rises to 22%. Lower
demand by these countries will affect not only volume traded, but also the prices of products
for which they constitute a major market.
The contraction of imports by East and South-East Asia has a direct impact on
demand for Latin American exports. In volume terms, however, the effect should be relatively
minor, because the market is not an important one for Latin American countries, with the
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exception of Chile and Peru, which in 1996 sold 14% and 9% of their exports, respectively,
to the eight Asian countries in question (see tables 1 and A-6).
Table 1










Argentina 6.0 2.2 8.2
Bolivia 0.3 0.3 0.6
Brazil 6.8 6.4 13.2
Chile 14.1 16.4 30.5
Colombia 0.7 3.3 4.0
Ecuador 7.0 2.8 9.8
Mexico 1.0 1.4 2.4
Paraguay 2.4 0.1 2.5
Peru 9.2 6.6 15.8
Uruguay 5.3 1.0 6.3
Venezuela 0.3 0.6 0.9
CACM 1.1 1.5 2.6
      Source: ECLAC, on the basis of International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.
Via the contraction of imports, however, the Asian crisis also had an impact on the
prices of Latin America’s export products (whether exported to Asia or to other regions),
especially commodities for which the East and South-East Asian countries constitute an
important part of world demand. In 1995, for example, these countries accounted for around
15% of world imports of agricultural raw materials, minerals and metals and petroleum.
Moreover, their share of world imports of minerals and metals was rapidly increasing (from
only 10% in 1990); in the case of copper, in particular, the countries of East and South-East
Asia accounted for nearly one third of world demand. They accounted for 9% of world
imports of food in 1995, but for a larger share in some subsectors, such as cereal grains (13%
of world imports) and oilseeds (see table A-7).
The Asian crisis will also have an impact on the exports of the countries in question.
Sharp currency devaluation, lower domestic demand and underutilized installed capacity
should favour the exports of the countries most involved in the crisis. At the same time, the
difficult financial conditions brought on by the crisis (tighter credit, higher interest rates, the
increased burden of debt denominated in foreign currencies) are tending to hinder rapid
expansion of export supply; for that reason, most of the trade adjustment so far has been in
the form of import reduction. It can be anticipated, however, that the Asian countries will
increase the quantity of their exports of manufactures in 1998, and that this will result in an
increase in value exported despite the expected decline in unit value, which could be as much
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as 9%, according to one recent estimate,15 and could put competitive pressure on the Latin
American countries, among others, in both their domestic and external markets.
Determination of the possible magnitude of the effect is complicated by the fact that
Asian exports do not compete directly with Latin American and Caribbean exports in the
markets of the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) (see table A-8). The Asian countries export consumer manufactures
and capital goods (such as electronic and electrical products, computers and other
machinery); the Latin American and Caribbean countries export a larger proportion of raw
materials and semi-manufactures to OECD countries, particularly to the European and
Japanese markets (see table A-9). The situation is different in the North American and Latin
American markets, the destination for most of the region's exports of manufactures, where
competition from Asian products could intensify in categories such as chemical products,
steel, textiles and footwear.
(b) Financial channels
During the first half of 1997, emerging markets enjoyed improved access to
international financing and narrower spreads on Eurobonds and Brady bonds. The result in
Latin America was a gross influx of capital amounting to some US$ 80 billion between
January and September, two thirds of that long-term capital. Foreign direct investment
maintained an upward trend with flows of US$ 44 billion. After the crisis broke in July,
spreads increased for some of the Asian countries affected, notably Thailand, Indonesia and
the Philippines (see figure 4), but held steady or declined in Latin America and other regions.
This situation changed in October, when abrupt stock market declines occurred not only in
other Asian countries, but also in the United States and Europe, and the risk premiums for
many emerging economies, including Latin American countries, shot up suddenly.
                                                          
15
 See World Bank, "Impact of the East Asian crisis on developing countries", PREM Briefing
Note, Washington, D.C., January-February 1998.
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Figure 4
Average spreads on Eurobonds issued by Asian countries,
at different maturities
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Source: On the basis of figures from Caisse des dépôts et des consignations, Paris.
By changing the climate in the international financial markets, especially for emerging
economies, the Asian crisis has had a direct impact on the sectors most sensitive to external
capital movements. Since some international investors felt the need for profit-taking in Latin
America in order to make up for their losses on other stock markets and maintain their
liquidity, the financial effects of the crisis first manifested themselves in falling prices on
Latin American stock exchanges. With much variation from country to country, the stock
market declines, combined with tougher terms of access to external capital, have affected not
only foreign exchange markets and banking systems, but all those looking to the international
capital markets for financing (including Governments).
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(c) Policy measures
The principal economic measures taken in response to the Asian crisis have been in
the areas of monetary, fiscal and trade policy. Monetary measures have been taken by
countries whose financial and foreign exchange markets have experienced volatility either as
a direct consequence of short-term capital flows (Brazil, Colombia and Paraguay) or as a
reaction to a fall in prices of exports (Chile and Mexico). Fiscal measures —chiefly budget
cuts— have been applied in response to declining fiscal revenues in countries that derive an
important part of their revenue from State sale of commodities, i.e., oil in Mexico, Ecuador,
Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, in Colombia and copper in Chile; or with a view to
influencing aggregate demand, in order to reduce an anticipated current account deficit, as
occurred in Brazil and could occur in Argentina. Brazil's fiscal package, which included tax
rises, was also necessary in order to finance the increase in interest payments on the domestic
public debt that would result from the monetary measures and to send a signal to financial
investors of a capacity for timely response.
Lastly, some countries have adopted or contemplated anti-dumping and safeguard
measures to protect domestic producers threatened with competition from Asian products
(Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and potentially Peru and Uruguay) and to improve the current
account balance (Brazil).
It is evident that Governments are reacting to the consequences of the Asian crisis
with measures that tend to slow economic activity, in that they tighten monetary policy, raise
taxes and cut public spending. The kinds of measures primarily adopted by selected
countries are shown in table 2. It should be noted that by the end of the first quarter of 1998,
some of these measures had been relaxed, so that their consequences will be less severe.
Table 2









Brazil X X X
Chile X X
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2. Magnitude of the effects of the Asian crisis and of policy measures
(a) The impact on the financial sector
The channels by which the Asian crisis has spilled over into the Latin American
region vary from country to country. As noted above, the financial factors basically came
into play in October 1997, when stock market and foreign exchange crises spread further and
internationally-based investors began to flee the emerging economies, especially the countries
that appeared to suffer from external imbalances similar to those of the Asian countries in
crisis, and to move their money to developed economies considered safer. In Latin America,
the country hardest hit was Brazil, which was experiencing a growing deficit on both its fiscal
accounts and its balance-of-payments current account. In international crisis situations, the
markets usually interpret the latter as a sign of an overvalued currency.
Until the events of October 1997, the region's stock exchanges were maintaining the
gains made earlier in the year, spreads on Latin American Eurobonds were continuing to
narrow, and capital inflows showed no signs of slackening. In fact, in the third quarter of
1997, international bank credit balances rose by US$ 10 billion, a figure roughly equal to the
increase for the entire first half.16 Then at the end of October, the perceived “country risk”
for the region's countries abruptly shot up in international financial markets (see figure 5) and
caused stock prices to drop sharply, by 20% on average (see table A-10).
The influx of financial capital dropped off noticeably during the last quarter of 1997:
international bond issues declined to under US$ 4 billion, compared with US$ 20 billion the
previous quarter (see figure 6 and table A-11). To a great extent, the decline was due to the
severe deterioration in the terms offered by the market, which, by demanding wider spreads
and shorter maturities, pushed potential issuers into a holding pattern (see table A-12).
Beginning in November 1997, a number of Governments and firms postponed issues they had
planned, although some returned to the market shortly thereafter: the Governments of
Argentina and Colombia placed debt paper beginning in January, Brazil in February and
Mexico in March 1998. Other Governments continued to wait for conditions to improve:
Venezuela announced that it would issue international debt paper in the second half of 1998.
For the region as a whole, bond issues rebounded during the first quarter of 1998; in this, the
Government of Argentina was particularly active, using the funds raised primarily to pay off
maturing debt (see table A-11).
                                                          
16
 See Bank of International Settlements, The Maturity and Sectoral Distribution of
International Bank Lending, Basle, various issues.
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Figure 5
Average spreads on Eurobonds issued by Latin American countries,
at different maturities
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Figure 6
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Along with a decline in bond placements, some countries experienced flight of short-
term capital; such outflows from Brazil reached US$ 8 billion in October, in effect an attack
on the currency.17 In Venezuela, the estimated outflow for the last quarter was US$ 700
million. Chile experienced currency pressures in December 1997 and January 1998; during
those months it suffered a cumulative drop in international reserves of US$ 1.8 billion. On
the other hand, there is no evidence that foreign direct investment in Latin America has been
affected by the events in Asia. Long-term factors, such as the privatizations due to come in
some countries, the liberalization of service markets and the funds attracted by integration
programmes (especially in Mercosur), support the assumption that foreign direct investment
will persist.18
International reserves shrank in Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay in October and later in
Chile, Colombia and Venezuela (see table A-13), but without causing major changes in
exchange rates; Brazil was able to maintain its scheme of periodic mini-devaluations, and
among the other countries only Paraguay experienced significant real depreciation (of around
10%) following the events of October 1997. Colombia, too, experienced significant
                                                          
17
 In November and December, the loss was partially recouped, so that the net outflow for the
quarter was US$ 5.075 billion.
18
 ECLAC, La inversión extranjera en América Latina y el Caribe, Informe 1997, Santiago,
Chile, 1998.
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depreciation, but that was prior to October and was the result of internal monetary and
foreign exchange policy. The Chilean peso, the Peruvian sol and the Mexican peso all
exhibited moderate slippage beginning in October-November 1997 (see table A-14). The
Government of Ecuador adjusted the exchange rate band in March 1998, in effect a 7.5%
devaluation.
In order to staunch (or prevent) the loss of reserves and the flight of deposits from
the banking system, various countries resorted to raising domestic interest rates significantly
(see table A-15). Thanks to these measures and the perception that banking systems were
sounder (in comparison with their condition when the "tequila effect" hit), the tension in some
foreign exchange markets was not accompanied by an appreciable loss of bank deposits (see
table A-16). Had it been otherwise, the pressures on exchange rates might have been much
greater, and a loss of deposits might have forced banks to cut lending, further slowing the
pace of economic activity, as happened in Mexico and Argentina in 1995.
The country hardest hit by the financial repercussions of the Asian crisis was, as
already mentioned, Brazil. At the end of October, the drop in the prices of its external debt
paper reduced the interest rate differential by which it attracted external capital (domestic
interest rates became insufficient, owing to the level of country risk), while at the same time
the decline of the main international stock markets induced foreign investors to realize their
gains on the Brazilian market. Both factors gave rise to a strong net demand for dollars, a
drop in reserves and a contraction in liquidity; in response, the Central Bank increased its
interest rate ("CBR") from 21.6% to 43.4% per annum. The increase added to the already
heavy pressure of the domestic public debt on fiscal accounts.19 The measure therefore had
to be supplemented in November by fiscal adjustments equivalent to nearly 2% of GDP.
From a longer-term perspective, in February 1998 Congress gave preliminary approval to two
bills that should bring about a reduction in public expenditure; one bill sets a limit to salaries
of civil servants and makes it easier to dismiss them; the other is aimed at reducing pension
payments. The monetary and fiscal measures adopted slowed the increase in the trade deficit,
but also depressed expectations of output growth. Recent figures indicate a decrease in
industrial activity (8% between October 1997 and February 1998, based on seasonally
adjusted figures), especially pronounced in the consumer durables industry (23% over the
same period).20 This reduction in growth has produced an increase in open unemployment
from 5.7% in October 1997 to 8.2% in March 1998, inducing the Government of Brazil to
accord the problem high priority.
Other countries, too, have been obliged to raise their interest rates to counteract or
prevent a loss of reserves, but the effects on growth have been much less dramatic than in
Brazil. In Argentina, the monthly average of the interbank rates jumped from 7.2% in
September to 13.5% in November, while prime rates doubled, reaching 14.2% per annum.
                                                          
19
 The increase in domestic interest rates generated (owing to the size of the Brazilian public
debt) extra fiscal expense estimated at around US$ 3 billion in 1997, which is expected to continue in
1998, but in decreasing amounts each month as the interest rate declines. See Instituto de Pesquisa
Econômica Aplicada, Carta de conjuntura no. 78, Brasilia, February 1998.
20
 See Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), Indicadores de conjuntura, Rio
de Janeiro, February 1998.
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However, bank deposits and international reserves continued to increase, allowing interest
rates and the supply of credit swiftly to return to normal.
In Chile, the prospects of a major deterioration of the current account balance
because of the fall in the price of copper led to greater demand for dollars on the part of
individuals and financial institutions. When the demand began to take on a speculative slant,
the Central Bank, after a modest devaluation of the peso, decided to intervene. The Central
Bank raised the real reference interbank interest rate from 6.5% to 7% in January 1998 and
then again in February to 8.5%. It did not, however, try to make up for the illiquidity the
banks themselves were generating by their purchases of dollars, a situation that pushed up the
rate on interbank loans to very high levels and brought the rate on Central Bank discountable
notes close to 19% in January and February 1998, compared to 10.6% in December 1997.
The problem of capital flight also confronted the Government of Colombia. The
Bank of the Republic increased the supply of foreign exchange by drawing on its reserves to
the tune of over US$ 500 million in the first two months of 1998; it lowered the reserve
requirement on external credits (from 30% to 25%), shortened the length of time such
deposits are held from 18 to 12 months and announced the country's receipt of foreign
exchange obtained through privatization and bond issues (US$ 800 million pending receipt at
the end of 1997). In addition, in order to influence general liquidity in the system, it raised the
interest rate on its 30-day bonds (títulos de participación) to 23% (21.5% in August 1997)
and in mid-February increased from 27% to 30% the interest rate on its one-day repurchase
agreements. These measures caused the interbank rate to rise from 24% to 40%, later
dropping back to 33%. Altogether, these decisions alleviated pressure on the price of the
dollar, and although they may have slowed the recovery in the growth rate observable
beginning in the second half of 1997, they should not prevent the country from achieving a
rate clearly higher than the previous year's figure of 3%.
Financial conditions in the region have improved since the end of the first quarter of
1998. Both external spreads and domestic interest rates have come down, and for the moment
it appears that the region will have no problem in obtaining external financing to cover the
current account deficit (which should be larger in 1998 than in 1997). Moreover, the country
with the largest deficit —Brazil— will have large inflows of capital due to privatization; in
fact, by March 1998, Brazil had already comfortably exceeded its international reserve level
prior to the crisis. After a temporary withdrawal, a number of Governments have returned to
the international financial market to finance their current deficits and debt amortization. It
would appear that the increase in the cost of external credit caused by the Asian crisis is not
going to affect gravely the region's external and fiscal sectors, since, after an initial phase of
sharp increases, spreads have tended to diminish. The main impact of the financial
components of the Asian crisis should come essentially from the restrictive monetary policies
and high domestic interest rates that Governments have been obliged to apply in order to
avoid a loss of international reserves and bank deposits.
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(b) The impact on trade
Though the effects of the Asian crisis in Brazil and Colombia, and, temporarily,
Argentina were mainly felt through financial channels, in several other countries trade was the
area most affected. In Chile, the financial effects were felt later than, and to a large extent
were due to, the effects on trade. The available data show that in the majority of the countries
the main impact of the crisis on trade so far has been a drop in prices for some commodities,
rather than a contraction in export volumes.
During the second half of 1997, mixed trends were evident in the prices of different
groups of commodities. The crisis does not appear to have had an effect on prices for food
products and fertilizers, which showed no significant variation. Nor does it appear to have
had an impact on beverage prices; their decline with respect to the high levels of the second
quarter of 1997 would seem to reflect good prospects for the Brazilian coffee harvest. In
contrast, declining prices were recorded for wood products, agricultural raw materials, metals
and minerals, and oil, for all of which East and South-East Asia is an important market (see
figure 7).
These price trends add up to worsening terms of trade for the region as a whole,
though not for all countries. In the first two months of 1998, Brazil’s terms of trade improved
slightly, reflecting the fact that falls in prices for some imported goods (oil, wheat and cotton)
and better prices for some exports (orange juice, soybean oil and pulp) more than made up
for the effects of declining prices for soya, sugar and coffee.21 In addition, the drop in oil
prices benefited oil importers, such as Chile and the Central American countries.
In Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela, lower prices for some commodities
(chiefly copper and oil) have had an adverse effect on exports and government revenues,
which are highly dependent on sales of these products. Colombia, which felt the same effect,
though to a lesser extent, intends to offset the drop in oil prices by exporting greater volumes.
In Chile, the fall in copper prices meant that the Government had to revise its budget
in order to deal with a projected shortfall of US$ 560 million (approximately 0.7% of GDP).
As a consequence, planned investments by State-owned enterprises were reduced by US$
340 million; the enterprises affected were the Corporación Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO),
the Empresa Nacional del Petróleo (ENAP) and the Empresa Nacional de Minería (ENAMI).
The worsening terms of trade are likely to mean that gross domestic income will grow at a
significantly lower rate than gross domestic product in 1998 (3.2% and 5.5%, respectively).
                                                          
21
 See Brazil, Ministério da Fazenda, Secretaria de Política Econômica, Boletim de
acompanhamento macroeconômico, Brasilia, March 1998.
28 IMPACT OF THE ASIAN CRISIS ON LATIN AMERICA
Figure 7
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 Statistics, Washington, D.C.
A similar picture is expected in Venezuela: GDP is projected to decrease slightly,
while GDP is expected to increase by not more than 3%. Both the limits placed on oil
production under Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) agreement and
public spending cutbacks imposed by the reduction in oil revenues will have an adverse
impact on GDP. In point of fact, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) normally generates
more than 50% of government revenues, and every dollar that the price of crude drops means
a loss in fiscal income of US$ 1.2 billion.
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In Mexico, the drop in oil prices is expected to mean that exports will grow at a
slower pace than in 1997, despite the fact that exports of manufactures (including by the
maquila industry) are expected to remain strong (the value of oil exports in January-February
1998 was 30% down from the same period in 1997). The impact on the fiscal sector is
considerable: oil accounts for more than a third of non-financial public sector revenues. The
result has been a reduction in budgeted expenditure of around 0.7% of GDP. In March 1998,
the Bank of Mexico changed its monetary policy, choosing to issue less primary money. It
did this to mitigate the effects of the drop in oil revenues on the exchange rate and inflation,
in the light of the volatility in the financial markets. The measure was seen as a signal to the
private sector, reaffirming government targets in respect of inflation (12%) and the average
exchange rate for the peso in 1998 (8.74 pesos to the dollar). The resulting increase in
interest rates raised the yield on government paper to 22% per annum, 3.8 points above its
previous level.
Ecuador is another country hard hit by the decline in oil prices, since oil and gas
sales account for 35% of its exports and generate about 30% of fiscal revenues. Should low
oil prices persist, the public sector deficit will amount to close to 6% of GDP, compared to
an initial target of 2.5%. The Government has decided to reduce budgeted spending by 5%
and to raise tariffs; it also put a proposal to Congress to increase value added tax (VAT), but
this was rejected. The fiscal and external difficulties (only partly attributable to the Asian
crisis), combined with the havoc caused by the “El Niño” weather phenomenon, mean that
growth forecasts have been scaled back from 3.5% to 2.5%.
Asia is a major export market for Peru, but Peru has largely been spared the effects
of the Asian crisis. The fall in traditional exports (primarily copper and fishmeal) projected
for 1998 is likely to be offset, at least in part, by the strength of non-traditional exports.
Declining prices for copper (which makes up about 16% of total exports) are not having a
significant impact on fiscal revenues, given the ownership structure of the industry;
accordingly, no special policy measures have been implemented.
In Argentina, revenues have dipped owing to lower prices for oil and grains; in
addition, growth in export volumes has faltered owing to slower growth in the Brazilian
economy. This is expected to affect exports of certain products that cannot easily be
redirected towards other markets, such as transport equipment. However, the value of exports
is not likely to fall, as there is expected to be a simultaneous increase in export volumes,
particularly commodities. In any event, real export growth will be modest. Moreover, the rise
in the external deficit presents the Government with a dilemma, since the output elasticity of
imports remains high, so that the maintenance of a rapid rate of growth could generate ever
larger external imbalances. The exports of Paraguay and Uruguay are also likely to be
affected by lower growth in the Brazilian economy.
Except in specific cases and categories such as those mentioned above, there has not
so far been a perceptible drop-off in export volumes: falling demand for Latin American
commodities in the Asian countries would appear to be balanced, at least in part, by the
relative strength of other markets. The available data for 1998 show that, in the case of
Brazil, declining demand from Asia has been more than offset by sales to the countries of the
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Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) and the European Union.22 Chile is a possible
exception, as in the first quarter of 1998, that country’s exports are believed to have shrunk
both in volume and in value.
Preliminary figures for Latin American trade for 1998 indicate that there has not been
a massive influx of goods from East and South-East Asia. This would appear to be further
proof of the difficulties countries of that region face in expanding their exports rapidly,
despite having devalued their currencies. In fact, China, which has not devalued its currency,
is one of the Asian countries that is continuing to increase its market share in Latin America
and the Caribbean. However, the difficulties of East and South-East Asian countries are
expected to be short-lived, and for that reason a number of Latin American countries have
adopted or announced anti-dumping or safeguard measures in view of the risk of an influx of
certain goods at very low prices. In Colombia, for instance, in late January the Supreme
Council on Foreign Trade considered introducing safeguard measures which could block for
up to four years the entry of foreign goods that threaten local production; Argentina
streamlined procedures for anti-dumping investigations in the case of Asian imports
(including watches, toys, footwear, textiles, electronic goods, food products and tools); and in
Peru and Uruguay, manufacturers are demanding the introduction of safeguard clauses to
protect the apparel and footwear industries.
The possibility that Latin American goods may lose ground in third country markets
as a result of renewed competition from Asia is a latent threat that may materialize in the
future when Asian exports have overcome their present difficulties. It is important, however,
to remember the advantages that trading areas confer on a number of countries in the region.
Thus, Mexico's maquila industry (one of the categories potentially threatened) is covered by
agreements that protect its share in the United States market.23 Though it is still too early to
draw conclusions, preliminary data for Mexico for 1998 point not to a slowdown, but rather
to sustained growth of such exports (up 18% in January-February, compared with the same
period in 1997).
To sum up, in 1998, declines in some prices and in the volumes exported to East and
South-East Asia are expected to be offset by increases in the volumes produced and exported
to other markets (including the intraregional market). Most countries are likely to experience
worsening terms of trade and export revenues will increase less rapidly than they might have,
had the Asian crisis not occurred; however, the purchasing power of exports is not expected
to decline from its 1997 level.
 (c) Outlook for 1998
As the second quarter of 1998 begins, there is a feeling of modest satisfaction in the
region regarding the Governments’ handling of the crisis and the robustness of economies.
Attacks on a number of currencies have been thwarted, stock market downturns have been
                                                          
22
 See Brazil, Ministério da Fazenda, Secretaria de Política Econômica, op.cit.
23
 Private-sector analysts in Mexico estimate that the greatest competition from Asia in the
United States market for textiles comes from China and Hong Kong, neither of which has devalued its
currency.
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halted and to some extent reversed, and domestic interest rates and rates on foreign loans are
gradually returning to pre-crisis levels. Nonetheless, the policies adopted to deal with the
Asian crisis and the new international context entail costs for the region and affect growth
opportunities.
Any attempt to quantify the impact of the Asian crisis on our region involves the
difficulty of isolating that impact from the effects of other contemporary events which
influence the economic performance of the Latin American countries and explain why
forecasts for growth in 1998 have been revised downward. To the extent that these events are
manifested through trade and financial channels, their effects are superimposed upon those of
the Asian crisis; it is therefore difficult to make reliable estimates of the extent to which any
phenomenon is due to the Asian crisis or to other unrelated factors.
An example of this overlapping of factors is seen in the pricing of certain
commodities, especially oil. Lower demand in the countries of East and South-East Asia is
not the only factor weakening oil prices, nor does it appear to be the most important one. On
the demand side, lower energy consumption in the developed countries due to an
exceptionally mild winter in the northern hemisphere has also played a part; on the supply
side, there has been a substantial increase in production, both within and outside OPEC. A
combination of factors seem to have influenced the fall in prices for other commodities. In
addition to falling demand in Asia, good grain and oilseed harvests are expected, particularly
in the United States. Also, while copper prices are perhaps the most deeply affected by the
Asian crisis, the market had already been anticipating a fall from relatively high levels in the
first half of 1997, owing to the magnitude of increases in production levels and stocks.
Many of the countries of the region have been or are being affected by the climatic
phenomenon known as “El Niño”. By altering ocean temperatures and rainfall patterns, it has
not only caused human and material losses, but also affected fisheries and agriculture by
producing drought in some areas and excess rainfall and floods in others. This has also led to
problems with hydroelectric power generation (particularly in Central America), forest fires,
and widespread destruction of dwellings and infrastructure. As a result, independently of the
Asian crisis the “El Niño” phenomenon has reduced growth and export forecasts for a
number of countries; it has also affected fiscal accounts.
Aside from the Asian crisis, growth forecasts for 1998 also take into account the
difficulty certain countries are expected to experience in maintaining growth rates at the high
1997 levels, with rapid growth in external imbalances, or after using up previously
underutilized production capacity.
Some of these factors were already taken into account in forecasts prepared by
ECLAC before the Asian crisis (particularly in the cases of Argentina, Mexico and Peru);
comparisons between those estimates and the current ones therefore provide an approximate
picture of the impact of the Asian crisis on GDP growth (see table 3). Thus, although GDP is
expected to increase by a little over 3% this year (a fall of more than two percentage points
over 1997), it had already been expected to fall by one percentage point regardless of the
Asian crisis. The latter will cut GDP growth in the region by roughly another percentage
point. If the worsening terms of trade are also taken into account, income growth in the region
will fall by about 1.5 percentage points over pre-crisis forecasts. This reduced growth rate
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will affect employment levels, making it more difficult to solve the problems of social
marginalization which characterize the region.
Table 3
Gross domestic product and gross domestic income at constant 1990 prices
(Growth projections for 1998 made in September 1997 and March 1998)
GDP GDP Difference GROSS
1998 1998 DOMESTIC INCOME
September 1997 March 1998 March 1998
(Percentage change in (Percentage change in (Percentage change in
growth over 1997) growth over 1997) growth over 1997)
(a) (b)  (b) - (a) (c)
Argentina 5.5 4.5 -1.0 4.2
Bolivia 5.0 4.5 -0.5 4.1
Brazil 3.5 1.1 -2.4 1.1
Chile 6.5 5.5 -1.0 3.2
Colombia 3.5 4.0 0.5 3.4
Costa Rica 3.5 3.5 0.0 3.9
Ecuador 3.5 2.5 -1.0 2.4
El Salvador 5.0 4.5 -0.5 4.7
Guatemala 3.5 5.0 1.5 3.9
Honduras 4.5 4.5 0.0 5.3
Mexico 5.0 5.0 0.0 4.2
Nicaragua 4.0 4.5 0.5 4.7
Panama 3.5 4.5 1.0 4.0
Paraguay 3.0 2.5 -0.5 3.0
Peru 4.5 4.5 0.0 4.8
Dominican Rep. 6.0 6.0 0.0 7.7
Uruguay 4.5 3.0 -1.5 5.2
Venezuela 5.0 3.0 -2.0 -0.1
TOTAL 4.4 3.2 -1.2 2.8
Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division.
It can be seen from the above that the main impact of the South-East Asian crisis is
on the growth forecast for Brazil, and also for its Mercosur partners, which are expected to be
affected by the loss of dynamism in the Brazilian economy. For Argentina, the projection
assumes some degree of adjustment to deal with the growing external deficit, resulting in a
fall in growth from 8% in 1997 to 4.5% in 1998; about one percentage point of that fall can
be attributed to the Asian crisis (see table 3).24 It should also be noted that there is a marked
difference between the growth rates of output and of income in certain countries hit by
deteriorating terms of trade; this is particularly true of Chile and Venezuela.
                                                          
24
 The economic authorities have announced their intention to deal with a growing trade and
current account deficit through increased capital inflows, without having recourse to monetary or fiscal
measures which might signal a “cooling-down” of the economy; this has led to a disagreement with the
International Monetary Fund. If that policy is followed, the ECLAC projection would to some extent
underestimate both GDP growth for 1998 and the size of the trade deficit.
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Table 4
Latin America: external trade in goods (f.o.b.), in current dollars
(Growth rates over the previous year)
1996      1997        1998 a
EXP IMP EXP IMP EXP IMP
Argentina 13.6 18.3 6.3 25.1 4.0 11.0
Bolivia 3.0 18.6 3.9 19.6 4.6 18.0
Brazil 2.7 7.3 11.0 15.1 6.5 1.0
Chile 7.9 4.4 9.9 10.4 1.0 6.0
Colombia -4.3 12.6 10.5 8.8 9.0 4.0
Costa Rica 2.7 -1.1 11.5 16.4 10.0 18.5
Ecuador 10.9 -9.6 5.9 22.5 1.0 15.0
El Salvador 61.2 -2.8 47.8 10.9 12.5 17.0
Guatemala -5.5 -5.0 17.6 14.4 5.0 10.0
Honduras 9.7 12.0 13.3 4.6 8.2 7.5
Mexico 20.7 23.5 15.0 21.7 13.2 18.0
Nicaragua 26.8 20.2 14.7 25.7 14.0 15.0
Panama -7.5 -9.7 11.6 12.0 8.0 7.8
Paraguay -5.6 -10.1 0.4 3.7 -0.5 4.0
Peru 5.9 2.0 15.6 9.7 -2.0 7.0
Dominican Rep. 11.6 17.8 14.5 15.4 9.2 12.0
Uruguay 15.8 17.2 10.7 9.8 7.5 7.0
Venezuela 22.3 -7.4 2.8 30.4 -2.0 19.0
TOTAL 11.8 11.4 10.6 17.2 7.8 9.4
Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division.
a
  Projected.
The value of exports will grow more slowly than in previous years, mostly owing to
falls in various commodity prices. Slower growth in imports is also expected, although they
will continue to grow faster than exports (see table 4). The region’s trade and current account
imbalances will thus continue to increase (see tables 5 and A-17).
This situation might place certain countries in a vulnerable position if the
international situation were to deteriorate. In particular, the fact that certain countries’
imports consistently grow faster than their exports is making sustained output growth
difficult: a persistent and growing current account deficit and growing external debt may not
be sustainable.
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Table 5
Current account balance as percentage of GDP
(On the basis of current values)
1996 1997 a 1998 b
Argentina -1.3 -3.0 -3.8
Bolivia -6.2 -7.0 -8.6
Brazil -3.3 -4.2 -3.7
Chile -5.4 -5.3 -6.2
Colombia -5.6 -4.7 -4.7
Costa Rica -1.7 -4.0 -6.1
Ecuador 1.6 -2.8 -5.0
El Salvador -1.7 -0.6 -2.3
Guatemala -3.0 -3.0 -3.7
Honduras -4.8 0.6 0.9
Mexico -0.6 -1.8 -2.9
Nicaragua -25.2 -17.4 -21.0
Panama 1.6 -3.7 -4.3
Paraguay -6.9 -7.5 -8.6
Peru -5.9 -4.7 -5.6
Dominican Rep. -0.8 -1.0 -0.5
Uruguay -1.6 -1.1 -1.2
Venezuela 13.1 5.9 2.8
TOTAL -2.1 -3.0 -3.5





3. Pending problems that influence regional prospects
A return to the macroeconomic conditions that prevailed before the crisis, with the costs
being limited to those described above, depends upon a set of circumstances that are mostly
beyond the control of Governments in the region. One positive factor is the strength of the
North American and European Union economies. According to the latest projections,25 the
effects of the crisis are not expected to amount to more than between 0.2 and 0.4% of these
countries’ output. Their real income is expected to benefit from an improvement in their
terms of trade, and lower prices for raw materials are expected to lower previous estimates
of inflation. Reduced investment in the developing countries, with consequent redirection of
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 For the United States, Project LINK March 1998 projections point to growth of 2.7% this
year (compared with 3.7% in 1997), an upward revision of forecasts made before the Asian crisis. IMF
April 1998 projections are for 2.9% and OECD projections for growth 2.7%; before the Asian crisis,
both institutions were forecasting slower expansion. Growth at the rate currently forecast is in line with
that considered sustainable without overheating the economy. Any recessionary effects of the Asian
crisis may be replacing measures to cool down the economy, since the rate of growth would in any case
have had to have slowed down. For the European Union, Project LINK projections for 1998 indicate
similar growth to that in 1997, around 2.5%, whereas OECD and IMF anticipate growth of 2.7% and
2.8% respectively. See Project LINK March Meeting, New York, 1998; OECD Economic Outlook,
No. 63, Paris, April 1998, and IMF, World Economic Outlook, Washington, D.C., April 1998.
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flows or greater retention of funds in the developed countries, explains the fall in long-term
interest rates.
The Asian situation stills presents great potential risks. Developments in Asia in the
first quarter of 1998 are positive. Initial agreements on renegotiating their debts may help
redress the lack of liquidity the countries affected by the crisis were facing at the beginning
of the year, the exception being Indonesia, which has still not yet managed to stabilize its
balance of payments. Stock markets in the region are gradually recovering and the market
value of several Asian currencies has appreciated. Financial systems have made progress
towards stabilization, although the persisting credit squeeze, high interest rates and
adjustment programmes will prolong problems of internal demand and debt repayment
capacity. The fact that China has not devalued its currency and does not seem disposed to do
so should also contribute to greater stability in Asia. Nevertheless, the most recent forecasts
for the Asian countries affected by the crisis are more pessimistic than those made initially.
The greatest risks appear to stem from the financial situation of Japan. The
difficulties hanging over its financial system since the start of the 1990s have been
aggravated by the crisis in East and South-East Asia.26 Commercial banks have suffered
capital losses (because of falls in the value of listed securities, among other reasons), in
circumstances in which they are being required to meet the Basle Committee’s capital-to-
assets ratio. Faced with this situation, they are having to curb the supply of credit and to have
recourse to government assistance. If these measures prove inadequate, it is not out of the
question that the Japanese banks’ difficulties may affect the international financial system
(for example, through the massive sale of financial assets abroad, which would drive up
international interest rates). The public assistance package for the banking system and
promised more active implementation of fiscal policy should prevent prospects worsening
and the economy contracting by more than the -0.5% currently forecast. A set of fiscal
measures to stimulate the economy by reviving internal consumption was announced in April
1998.
In view of the fact that balance-of-payments adjustment is basically being achieved
through a sharp cut-back in imports and the prospects for Japanese growth have deteriorated
and may provoke a reduction in forecast imports, it is to be feared that a downswing in intra-
Asian trade will provoke greater recessionary pressures than have been expected. In
particular, there is a potentially dangerous risk for Latin America and the Caribbean that the
affected countries will pursue an aggressive policy of exporting manufactures at reduced
prices. In such a case, some sectors, especially labour-intensive goods, could be adversely
affected by greater competition both in internal sales and in exporting to third markets. Such
pressure could intensify if the Asian crisis were to lead to new competitive devaluations in
that region. This could cause a fall in inflation in the developed countries which in extreme
cases could be transformed into deflation.
Lastly, it is being debated how long the affected countries will take to pull out of the
crisis and what their economic momentum will be in the medium and long term. Of course,
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 Among transnational banks, Japanese banks are the principal lenders to countries in the
region. In June 1997, they provided 55% of external bank credit received by Thailand and 39% of that
received by Indonesia; for Malaysia and the Republic of Korea, the percentages were 36% and 23%,
respectively. See Bank for International Settlements, op. cit.
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these questions will not unduly affect economic performance forecasts for 1998, but the
speed and extent of the Asian economies’ recovery will play an important role on certain
markets that are significant for Latin America, and will be important elements in international
forecasts for the medium and long term.
One market with an uncertain future that has a strong influence (albeit varying in
nature and intensity) on countries in our region is the oil market. Asian recovery could
strengthen demand, but a more crucial factor appears to be the trend in supply from the oil-
exporting countries (whether members of OPEC or not). The behaviour of the principal Latin
American exporters in this respect will have a direct effect on their economic growth,
depending on the share of the oil industry in overall output.
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III.  LESSONS OF THE ASIAN CRISIS FOR
LATIN AMERICA
An examination of the origins and magnitude of the Asian crisis and of the mechanisms
through which its effects are being transmitted to Latin America reveals the nature and
inherent danger of current international movements of capital. Several lessons can be drawn
concerning the need to strengthen the capacity of the countries of our region to respond.
Some proposals as to criteria and policies that might be adopted are set out below. Although
interrelated, for the purposes of analysis they are separated into national and international
categories.
1. National aspects
The diverse origins of the Asian crisis reflect the growing number of factors that increase
countries’ external vulnerability in the current international context. The three sets of factors
involved are macroeconomic, institutional and those relating to production structure and
competitiveness. Assigning responsibility to any one of them in isolation is generally not a
sufficient explanation of vulnerability, and does not take into account the interrelationship
between the various factors. By way of example, it was not in itself the weakness of the
banking system that led to the crisis; this weakness coincided with strong growth and stable
prices and reserves until the balance-of-payments capital account was liberalized and short-
term foreign capital flooded in. All the same, financial openness would cause fewer problems
if there were a well-regulated banking system and if macroeconomic policies were governed
by medium- and long-term criteria. The combination of large balance-of-payments deficits,
loss of confidence in export potential and competitiveness, and high-risk local bank portfolios
created a climate of distrust, the effect of which was far greater than that of any one of these
factors taken separately. In short, an important lesson to be learned from the Asian
experience is that macroeconomic, institutional and competitiveness policies should be
coordinated and should be consistent.
In the macroeconomic area, there is a need to examine the policies that preceded the
crises. In both the Asian and the Latin American cases, policy management in periods of
expansion had a considerable influence on subsequent difficulties. Beginning in the 1970s,
countries in our region had to confront abrupt changes in external capital flows, in addition to
the usual fluctuations in commodity export earnings. This accentuated outside influences on
the sharp changes in output levels characteristic of most developing countries. There were
thus successive periods of expansion and contraction, the contraction of the 1980s attaining
the level of a prolonged crisis.
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In the periods of expansion, external flows were channelled into a rapid expansion of
public and private spending, with the encouragement of creditors. The external flows led
many agents into overindebtedness, which prompted foreign banks to withdraw their loans
abruptly in subsequent periods. When the flow of external capital was re-established at the
beginning of the 1990s, several countries adopted policies to differentiate between different
types of capital and to guard against inflows leading to situations of overindebtedness during
periods of expansion. Nevertheless, the crisis that affected Mexico at the end of 1994
showed that not every country implemented policies capable of preventing such situations.
It would therefore seem desirable to adopt fiscal and monetary policies designed to
even out spending over time. During periods of expansion, it is possible to exercise greater
selectivity with regard to kinds and amounts of capital flows and to levy temporary taxes to
discourage private spending. Such measures can act as a brake on the private spending boom
in periods when there is a surge in external inflows, and vice versa. Moreover, instead of
setting fiscal goals on the basis of the current deficit, policy makers might use a structural
deficit indicator, as OECD countries do. This approach preferably entails sterilizing the
transitory tax revenues characteristic of expansionary periods and setting up stabilization
funds to manage the less stable types of fiscal revenues. Many countries may also find it
beneficial to offset short-term trends in private spending (both expansionary and
contractionary) in whole or in part through compensatory changes in public expenditure or
revenue.
The application in practice of these fiscal policy criteria in the face of abrupt
fluctuations in inflows calls for different efforts on the part of the countries of the region,
depending on their stage of growth and reform. Those countries that have initiated sustainable
growth and have made progress with reforms will be able to apply the proposed criteria more
easily. Other countries are confronted by more serious problems which require additional
efforts. The latter countries will need to increase investment considerably in order to
overcome relative stagnation or very slow growth, redress social lags that seriously
compromise equality of opportunity and the productive potential of human capital, and
finance reforms that can be very costly, such as reform of the banking system, social security
and the health and education sectors. In this context, advantage can be taken of periods of
expansion to carry out spending programmes that can eliminate bottlenecks in the economy,
thus overcoming stagnation. This requires, however, that programmes be put in place to
ensure the efficient use of increased fiscal revenues and access to external credit and to
prevent the effects of greater expenditure from overwhelming the economy’s capacity to
respond in a non-inflationary way.
In macroeconomic management, short-term approaches must be replaced by a vision
for the medium or long term. As the Asian crisis has shown, in order to assess the dynamic
equilibrium of the balance of payments, trends in four areas must be examined jointly:
exports, imports, foreign capital and reserves. When changes in the evolution of any
of these variables give rise to a significant deficit in the balance-of-payments current account,
it is vital to be able to assess the sustainability of that deficit. A relevant example is that of
imports growing faster than exports, systematically sustained by the inflow of capital —this
proved to be the prelude to crisis in both Latin America and Asia. The internal counterpart of
this disequilibrium relates to the evolution of public and private spending and the behaviour
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of the banking sector. In this and other cases, vulnerability, and especially the opinion in that
regard formed by important external agents, is linked to the level and fluctuation of reserves.
In addition, any assessment concerning the entry of capital must take into consideration the
purposes for which such capital is intended, and in particular whether it is being invested in
export sectors or is strengthening competitiveness in the production of tradable goods.
With respect to monetary policy, measures can be introduced to give it greater
autonomy. One such measure is the use of mechanisms to discourage excessive inflows of
short-term capital, such as the reserve requirements imposed in Colombia and Chile, and
variable taxes on financial movements in Brazil. There is growing consensus that, despite
their flaws, such mechanisms play a positive role in discouraging excessive inflows and
decreasing the proportion of short-term flows.27 The latter action, in particular, makes a
country less vulnerable to exchange crises. Discouraging excessive capital inflows,
moreover, helps lessen pressure to strengthen the value of the national currency excessively;
this in turn helps to maintain export competitiveness and dynamism and to control the size of
the balance-of-payments current account deficit.
In the institutional sphere, Latin America have made progress towards correcting an
extremely weak banking situation, the legacy of the 1980s and 1994-1995 crises, and the lack
of prudential control. In several countries, Brazil for example, this has involved reform of the
State banks and intervention in some private banks. Other countries, such as Argentina, have
preferred to consolidate and recapitalize the banking system, allowing for a higher proportion
of foreign banks. And, in general, there has been increasing awareness of the need to ensure
that bank portfolios do not present serious risks of insolvency.
Nevertheless, much still remains to be achieved. These reforms now require new
capital investment and, in many cases, public resources. To be successful, the policies need
to be backed by appropriate legislation and budgetary resources. There is wide consensus
concerning the need to strengthen prudential control of banks. Among other measures, a much
higher capital-to-assets ratio should be required for banks than is recommended by the Basle
Committee, since currency crises in Latin American countries can be particularly detrimental
to bank assets. In any case, as the Asian crisis again demonstrates, in the developing
countries, financial openness should be strictly conditional upon the prior existence of strong
prudential regulation.
The policies that are established in this area must coincide with a medium- and long-
term macroeconomic vision. Prudential policy, and especially the rating of bank portfolios,
should be based on relative prices that are not limited to current prices, since the latter can
be influenced by cyclical factors, such as the inflow of short-term external credits.
With respect to changing production patterns and competitiveness, study of the crisis
and prospects in Asia is of special interest for our region. It reveals the rapid changes in
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 See ECLAC, América Latina y el Caribe: Políticas para mejorar la inserción en la
economía mundial, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1998, Parte tercera;
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and Helmut Reisen (eds.), Flujos de capital e inversión productiva: lecciones
para América Latina, Santiago, Chile, McGraw-Hill, ECLAC and OECD, 1997; Guillermo Perry and
Daniel Lederman, Financial Vulnerability, Spillover Effects and Contagion: Lessons from the Asian
Crises for Latin America, World Bank, Washington D.C., 3 March 1998, p. 18.
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international goods and non-financial services markets and permits an evaluation of Latin
American external trade from that standpoint. For example, the entry of countries like China
and India into the market for certain manufactured products can seriously affect prices and
limit small countries’ chances for market access, because of the huge production potential of
continent-sized countries. On the other hand, the sharp fall in prices on semi conductor
markets is an example of how manufactured goods can be subject to price fluctuations that
used to be considered more typical of raw materials.
Hence, the environment created by the Asian crisis underscores the need for the
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to continue promoting export diversification.
The expansion and diversification of exports so far achieved by a number of countries in our
region cannot be considered self-sustaining. Continuous monitoring of competitiveness and of
the evolution of external markets, including their possible saturation, is essential.
2. International aspects
As far as international financial arrangements are concerned, the most recent crises have
brought out two problems: the major flaws in the international capital market and the great
vulnerability of developing economies to shocks emanating from this market. With respect to
the first of these phenomena, it has to be said that, if lack of adequate prudential regulation of
their internal financial markets has been evident in the majority of the Asian countries
affected by the crisis, the absence of appropriate international institutions to manage such a
sophisticated but unstable financial market has been an even more damaging factor. The
successive waves of excessive expansion followed by financial panic show that the market
tends to grow and then contract much further than the fundamentals of the economies would
warrant.
A common factor in the recent crises has been the great volatility of the most rapidly
growing segment of international financial markets. The causes of this volatility are partly to
do with the nature of money. But they are also related to inadequacies in macroeconomic
coordination among the countries that have most influence in world markets and to the
limitations of the international institutions in the areas of regulation, policy coordination and
information at the global level. These inadequacies are not compatible with a balanced and
efficient globalization process. No international institution exists that helps prevent
unsustainable financial booms developing, and the International Monetary Fund only has
limited capacity to manage the subsequent crises.
For their part, the rating agencies, which play a role on this front, tend to heighten
these trends rather than to moderate them, as a recent OECD Development Centre study28
shows. These agencies, like financial traders, play a very useful microeconomic role in
development. They have also, however, perhaps without meaning to, played a role that has
macroeconomic effects. Through their ratings (in the case of agencies) and with their
expectations widely published in the economic press (in the case of financial traders), they
have helped to strengthen financial flows towards “winner” countries, with the resulting
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 “Emerging Market Risk and Sovereign Credit Ratings”, Technical papers, No. 124, OECD
Development Centre, Paris, April 1997.
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continued rise in the price of financial and real estate assets and marked currency
appreciation in the recipient markets. Regardless of the quality of prudential supervision of
those markets, such macroeconomic signals help prolong a process that appears to be very
efficient and sustainable (with good profits and loan collateral supported by the high prices of
assets and the low prices of liabilities in dollars), but which in reality generates bubbles that,
sooner or later, burst. At that point, all these signals, including the risk ratings, are reversed,
accentuating the slide and deepening the crisis.
In theory, the countries that receive funds have a certain leeway to define their
national policies regarding capital flows. They can passively allow external capital to be
transmitted to their internal markets, or they can attempt to moderate or graduate the flows
over time, to alter the composition of the flows and soften their effects on the exchange rate
and aggregate demand. The predominant practice has been for recipient countries to be urged
to adopt, and praised for adopting, a policy of accepting all the resources offered to them at
the stage when capital inflows are increasing. With the pressures to open up the capital
account, these countries are pushed into the disequilibrium which then provokes the crisis.
The recriminations for having become excessively indebted come later, during the periods of
massive outflow. There is an obvious contradiction between these two attitudes. There is
also a contradiction in the fact that more energy is spent resolving crises than preventing
them.
It is a good time then to rethink international financial arrangements, but not a good
time to contemplate further liberalization of the financial market, a topic now being debated
in connection with changing the By-Laws of the International Monetary Fund to give it a
mandate with respect to capital account convertibility. The lessons of the Mexican crisis
seem to be being overlooked surprisingly fast and the costly adjustments in the wake of the
crashes caused by financial imbalances regarded with far too much complacency.
The existence of major imperfections in international capital markets clearly justifies
considerable expansion of International Monetary Fund resources, to ensure that, in
collaboration with other institutions and Governments, it can reduce the harmful effects of
large-scale exchange rate and financial crises in individual countries and prevent the
contagion from spreading to other emerging economies.
Moreover, steps should be taken to avoid the existence and activities of the
International Monetary Fund leading to the problem of “moral hazard” —that is, international
private investors and lenders taking on excessive risks, knowing that they will be rescued if
the situation becomes critical. In the event of a crisis, private lenders should do their part to
overcome it by rolling over loans as they become due without demanding higher interest or
government guarantees, so that the resources of international financial institutions and
Governments can be devoted to financing the recovery of economies in crisis, rather than to
paying off prior debts. Of course, the ideal is to prevent such situations from occurring, by
taking action at the international level during periods of excessive optimism, in order to
moderate the cycle of capital flows to emerging economies and thus ensure that such flows
are more sustainable.
For this reason, it is important to improve and above all complete international
prudential supervision arrangements. There appear to be two topics that require priority
attention. First, it seems essential to improve the existing prudential supervision and
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regulation of short-term international credit in the developed countries. Second, some degree
of prudential regulation of the portfolio investments of institutional investors, such as mutual
funds, would also appear to be vital. There is a parallel here with the prudential measures of
the central banks of developed countries, whereby provisions weighted by risk are required
to balance possible losses resulting from bank loans to developing countries. The prudential
requirements for institutional investors would follow the same principle, but would be duly
adapted to the institutional characteristics of the mutual funds.
The prudential supervision of international credit and capital markets could be
complemented with an international tax measure. A small tax at the global level on all foreign
currency transactions would act as a relatively strong disincentive to very short-term
speculative flows (which would involve frequent payments), and would have a very marginal
impact on long-term flows. Such a tax would increase somewhat the autonomy of national
economic authorities in making monetary policy. Moreover, by cutting back the more volatile
flows, it would help emerging economies’ exchange rates to reflect long-term fundamental
variables to a greater degree, and to a lesser degree marked changes in short-term perceptions
of risks or profitability.
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STATISTICAL  ANNEX
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Table A-1
ECONOMIES OF EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA: SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS
          ANNUAL CHANGE IN ANNUAL CHANGE IN ANNUAL CHANGE IN
           GROSS DOMESTIC EXPORTS, IN CURRENT IMPORTS, IN CURRENT CURRENT ACCOUNT
PRODUCT VALUES VALUES BALANCE
  (In percentages) (In percentages) (In percentages) (As percentage of GDP)
1996 1997 1998 a/ 1996 1997 1998 a/ 1996 1997 1998 a/ 1996 1997 1998 a/
China 9.6 8.5 7.0 17.9 21.0 5.0 19.5 2.3 13.8 1.5 4.4 1.3
Rep. of Korea 7.1 5.7 -2.0 4.1 7.2 5.1 12.2 -2.3 -8.2 -4.8 -2.0 3.6
Philippines 5.7 5.1 2.4 16.5 22.8 20.7 20.5 12.0 9.4 -4.0 -3.2 -3.0
Hong Kong (China) 5.0 5.4 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 3.0 5.0 4.2 -1.7 -4.1 -4.5
Indonesia 8.0 4.6 -3.5 9.7 8.3 3.3 5.7 -7.1 -11.2 -3.0 -0.5 0.3
Malaysia 8.6 7.3 2.0 6.0 4.5 -15.1 1.0 5.1 -16.4 -4.6 -4.3 0.2
Singapore 6.9 7.3 3.0 6.4 -4.7 -0.7 5.4 -5.0 0.0 16.2 16.1 12.9
Thailand 5.5 0.6 -2.5 -1.9 3.8 7.1 0.8 -13.4 -7.9 -8.0 -1.8 1.4
Taiwan (China) 5.7 6.2 4.0 3.6 8.1 1.5 -0.5 8.7 3.1 4.0 2.3 2.8
a/  Projected.
ANNUAL INFLATION ANNUAL CHANGE IN CHANGE IN STOCK MARKET
RATE (CPI) EXCHANGE RATE INDEX DURING THE
PERIOD
(In percentages) (In percentages) (In percentages)
1996 1997 1998 a/ 1996 1997 1998 a/ 3-97/9-97 9-97/12-97 12-97/3-98
INDEX
China 8.4 2.8 3.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 … … …
Rep. of Korea 5.0 4.4 10.4 4.3 18.3 64.0 -5.9 -40.6 36.8 COMPOSITE
Philippines 8.4 7.2 9.9 1.6 12.4 37.9 -93.8 -5.0 21.1 COMPOSITE
Hong Kong (China) 6.0 5.8 4.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 26.7 -28.9 9.3 HANG SENG
Indonesia 8.0 6.5 8.0 4.2 24.5 156.5 -23.1 -20.0 25.0 COMPOSITE
Malaysia 3.6 2.7 1.0 0.5 11.8 22.7 -33.3 -25.0 20.8 COMPOSITE
Singapore 1.3 2.0 1.7 -0.5 5.3 6.7 -3.9 -22.4 10.5 STRAITS
Thailand 5.9 6.2 16.8 1.7 23.8 46.8 -20.0 -35.7 44.4 S.E.T.
Taiwan (China) … -0.4 5.4 b/ 3.8 3.3 14.4 8.1 -0.6 9.8 WEIGHTED 
a/ Projected. b/  Corresponds to the variation in the wholesale price index.
   
  
Source: Project LINK, World Outlook , New York, March 1998; Malcolm Dowling, The Asian Currency and Economic Crisis - Macroeconomic Performance and Policy , paper 
               presented at the meeting of Project LINK, United Nations, New York, March 1998.
46 IMPACT OF THE ASIAN CRISIS ON LATIN AMERICA
Table A-2
SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE ECONOMIES OF EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA
1985 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
 
Rep. of General govt. current balance a/ 2,7 4,7 2,4 4,0 5,2 2,7 n.d.
Korea Current account balance a/ -0,9 -0,9 -1,5 0,1 -1,2 -2,0 -4,9
Gross domestic saving a/ 33,5 36,2 35,2 35,4 35,7 36,8 35,2
Gross domestic investment a/ 29,6 36,9 36,6 35,1 36,1 37,0 38,2
International reserves b/ 2881 14809 17137 20244 25656 32696 33771
Share of manufacturing output c/ 25,3 29,2 29,1 28,9 29,4 30,0 30,0
Philippines Central govt. current balance a/ 2,4 -0,3 1,8 2,1 2,8 3,3 3,5
Current account balance a/ -0,3 -5,8 -1,6 -5,5 -4,6 -4,4 -4,3
Gross domestic saving a/ 18,8 18,7 14,9 13,8 14,9 14,6 15,7
Gross domestic investment a/ 14,3 24,2 21,3 24,0 24,1 22,2 24,9
International reserves b/ 672 3414 4538 4831 6165 6558 10179
Share of manufacturing output c/ 25,2 25,5 25,0 24,7 24,8 25,3 25,3
Hong Kong Central govt. current balance a/ 2,9 3,8 5,1 5,6 4,3 2,8 2,3
(China) Trade balance a/ 10,1 8,8 5,7 7,6 1,3 -3,4 -1,0
Gross domestic saving a/ 33,2 37,3 36,0 37,4 35,2 30,4 30,3
Gross domestic investment a/ 23,1 28,5 30,3 29,8 33,9 33,8 31,3
International reserves b/ n.d. 28807 35174 42987 49253 55399 63277
Share of manufacturing output c/ 22,1 17,6 13,6 11,2 9,2 8,1 n.d.
Indonesia Central govt. current balance a/ 7,5 7,8 8,2 7,9 8,0 6,6 6,7
Current general govt. results d/ n.d. 1,3 -1,2 -0,7 0,0 0,8 1,4
Current account balance a/ -2,2 -2,6 -2,0 -1,3 -1,6 -3,6 -3,3
Gross domestic saving a/ 29,8 32,3 35,3 35,3 35,3 35,2 34,0
Gross domestic investment a/ 28,0 30,7 32,4 33,2 34,0 37,2 32,7
International reserves b/ 5093 7614 10599 11412 12291 13869 18254
Industry as % of GDP (constant prices) 15,8 20,6 21,5 22,3 23,3 23,9 n.d.
Malaysia Central govt. current balance a/ 3,0 3,9 4,8 5,7 7,6 6,6 5,8
Current account results a/ -2,0 -2,1 -3,8 -4,7 -6,4 -8,5 -5,3
Gross domestic saving a/ 32,7 33,4 37,1 35,9 38,8 39,5 41,7
Gross domestic investment a/ 27,6 30,4 35,1 37,8 40,4 43,2 43,0
International reserves b/ 5002 9871 17343 27365 25545 23898 26904
Share of manufacturing output c/ 19,7 26,9 28,9 30,1 31,6 33,1 34,5
Singapore Central govt. current balance a/ 7,4 10,3 11,4 13,6 8,9 4,7 n.d.
Current account results a/ 0,0 8,5 11,3 7,5 17,1 16,9 15,0
Gross domestic saving a/ 40,6 45,6 46,6 47,0 49,7 50,8 50,5
Gross domestic investment a/ 42,5 36,0 36,0 37,7 32,7 33,1 35,1
International reserves b/ 12846 27750 39885 48362 58178 68696 76208
Share of manufacturing output c/ 23,6 28,4 27,1 26,9 27,5 27,8 26,9
Thailand Central govt. current balance a/ -0,6 7,4 6,5 6,9 8,3 8,3 7,4
Current account balance a/ -3,9 -8,4 -5,5 -4,9 -5,4 -7,9 -7,8
Gross domestic saving a/ 24,8 35,0 35,9 35,6 35,2 36,2 35,9
Gross domestic investment a/ 28,2 41,3 40,0 40,4 41,0 43,3 42,8
International reserves b/ 2286 13429 20478 24593 59459 36112 37541
Share of manufacturing output c/ 22,5 27,8 29,5 30,3 30,4 32,2 32,6
Taiwan General govt. current balance a/ 1,9 3,0 -0,2 0,8 0,9 0,8 -0,2
(China) Current account balance a/ 14,8 6,8 3,9 3,0 2,5 1,9 3,8
Gross domestic saving a/ 32,9 28,1 27,0 27,0 25,8 25,6 25,2
Gross domestic investment a/ 19,2 23,1 24,9 25,2 23,9 23,7 21,4
International reserves b/ 22748 73117 82958 84228 93150 91017 87983
Share of manufacturing output c/ 37,1 33,6 32,2 31,1 30,8 30,8 30,5
Source: Based on Asian Development Bank figures, except where indicated otherwise.
a/ Percentage of GDP, at current values.
b/ In millions of dollars, at current values. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics , Washington, D.C., various issues.
c/ Percentage of GDP, at constant values.
d/ Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook,  Washington, D.C., December 1997. 
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Table A-3  
TRENDS IN DOMESTIC LENDING BY BANKS IN ECONOMIES OF EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA a/
1985 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Rep. of Lending as a percentage of GDP 51.9 54.0 54.9 55.5 57.4 56.9 58.3
Korea Real lending, 1985 = 100 b/ 100.0 167.8 195.7 209.1 235.1 254.3 278.3
Philippines Lending as a percentage of GDP 34.6 24.8 20.5 46.3 48.5 56.9 68.8
Real lending, 1985 = 100 b/ 100.0 90.3 74.4 171.5 187.7 230.5 294.3
Hong Kong Deposits as a percentage of GDP 147.1 209.6 200.3 204.5 190.9 198.0 198.9
(China) Real deposits, 1985 = 100 b/ 100.0 209.7 219.0 233.6 233.6 275.9 290.3
Indonesia Lending as a percentage of GDP 14.4 44.2 44.8 48.2 50.2 51.5 54.2
Real lending, 1985 = 100 b/ 100.0 447.9 529.4 611.9 683.0 759.9 861.7
Malaysia Lending as a percentage of GDP 67.4 78.7 76.9 78.6 76.1 84.9 93.3
Real lending, 1985 = 100 b/ 100.0 162.4 185.9 206.2 218.3 266.0 315.8
Singapore Lending as a percentage of GDP 111.3 100.7 103.3 100.3 98.9 105.7 111.1
Real lending, 1985 = 100 b/ 100.0 135.5 184.5 197.7 215.5 250.3 281.7
Thailand Lending as a percentage of GDP 66.1 70.1 73.8 80.9 91.7 97.4 99.3
Real lending, 1985 = 100 a/ 100.0 173.4 214.1 254.0 313.1 361.7 393.6
Taiwan Lending as a percentage of GDP 74.9 103.5 135.5 147.6 158.4 162.1 159.9
(China) Real lending, 1985 = 100 b/ 100.0 213.9 321.9 372.4 426.1 462.4 481.8
Source: Based on Asian Development Bank figures.
a/ For Hong Kong (China), deposits are indicated, no lending figures being available.
b/ The real values of balances were estimated using each country's GDP deflator.
Table A-4
FOREIGN BANK LOANS TO SIX ASIAN ECONOMIES
June 1992-June 1997
Total credit balances Lending for less than one year
(in millions of dollars) (in percentages of the  total)
Junio-92 Junio-94 Junio-97 Junio-92 Junio-94 Junio-97
Rep. of Korea 36889 48068 103432 70.6 72.6 67.9
Philippines 7114 5926 14115 40.3 44.7 58.8
Indonesia 27610 30902 58726 57.2 60.9 59.0
Malaysia 7722 13874 28820 41.0 59.1 56.4
Thailand 21372 36542 69382 68.6 74.3 65.7
Taiwan (China) 14559 18362 25163 93.0 92.7 87.3
Banking sector borrowing Non-banking private sector
(in percentages of the total) borrowing (in percentages of the total)
Junio-92 Junio-94 Junio-97 Junio-92 Junio-94 Junio-97
Rep. of Korea 59.9 66.4 65.1 29.7 25.7 30.6
Philippines 23.2 19.2 38.9 20.8 34.3 48.0
Indonesia 19.7 23.2 21.1 55.4 56.5 67.7
Malaysia 29.7 36.3 36.4 25.3 43.0 57.1
Thailand 26.5 32.8 37.6 60.7 60.0 59.5
Taiwan (China) 59.6 67.1 61.6 35.4 29.1 36.8
Source: Based on Bank for International Settlements, The Maturity and Sectoral Distribution of International Bank Lendings , Basle, various issues.
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Table A-5
ECONOMIES WITH THE FASTEST TRADE GROWTH IN CURRENT DOLLARS a/
(Annual averages for the period 1990-1996)
 Exporting countries Percentage Importing countries Percentage
growth in growth in
exports imports
Malaysia 18 Argentina 34
Philippines 17 Poland 22
China 16 Malaysia 18
Thailand 16 Philippines 18
Singapore 15 China 17
Mexico 15 Brazil 17
Ireland 13 Colombia 16
Kuwait 12 United Arab Emirates 15
Rep. of Korea 12 Chile 15
Indonesia 12 Mexico 14
Argentina 12 Singapore 14
India 11 Rep. of Korea 14





Source: World Trade Organization.
a/ Countries whose exports or imports exceeded US$ 10 billion in 1996 and grew at a rate at least one and a half times 
the world average figure of 7% during the period 1990-1996.
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Table A-6
EXPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA TO THE ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION, 1996
(In thousands of dollars and percentages)
DESTINATION                   Argentina            Bolivia                 Brazil           Chile             Colombia Ecuador
Value       % Value       % Value          % Value         % Value     % Value %
EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1424230 6.0 2919 0.3 3246919 6.8 2177568 14.1 80723 0.7 344565 7.0
     Rep. of Korea 204001 0.9 550 0.1 838436 1.8 892210 5.8 30568 0.3 314421 6.4
     Philippines 64878 0.3 … … 322120 0.7 103211 0.7 1770 0.0 2432 0.0
     Indonesia 222439 0.9 25 0.0 290744 0.6 147478 1.0 2738 0.0 224 0.0
     Malaysia 303147 1.3 2169 0.2 233225 0.5 69584 0.5 2318 0.0 742 0.0
     Singapore 43598 0.2 … … 333121 0.7 88056 0.6 10801 0.1 115 0.0
     Thailand 144803 0.6 16 0.0 395594 0.8 119016 0.8 6322 0.1 759 0.0
     Taiwan (China) 225441 0.9 157 0.0 400968 0.8 652634 4.2 6716 0.1 22178 0.5
     Hong Kong ( China) 215923 0.9 2 0.0 432711 0.9 105379 0.7 19490 0.2 3694 0.1
Japan 512457 2.2 3786 0.3 3047112 6.4 2530559 16.4 372441 3.3 138699 2.8
SOUTH-EAST ASIA+Japan 1936687 8.1 6705 0.6 6294031 13.2 4708127 30.6 453164 4.1 483264 9.9
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES 1146865 4.8 282 0.0 1883944 3.9 584831 3.8 28699 0.3 74466 1.5
     Bangladesh 72160 0.3 … … 61953 0.1 7360 0.0 1 0.0 5 0.0
     China 607449 2.6 274 0.0 1113819 2.3 372931 2.4 6987 0.1 67121 1.4
     India 183327 0.8 6 0.0 184908 0.4 99161 0.6 1403 0.0 3646 0.1
     Pakistan 68006 0.3 … … 90553 0.2 0.0 818 0.0 … …
OTHER COUNTRIES 20725778 87.0 1079949 99.4 39567246 82.9 10113598 65.6 10700279 95.7 4331964 88.6
TOTAL EXPORTS 23809330 100.0 1086936 100.0 47745221 100.0 15406556 100.0 11182142 100.0 4889694 100.0
DESTINATION                              Mexico                          Paraguay                              Peru                  Uruguay                Venezuela     CACM
Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % Value %
EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1000251 1.0 24983 2.4 536706 9.2 127815 5.3 63121 0.3 78437 1.1
     Rep. of Korea 191902 0.2 846 0.1 145133 2.5 11149 0.5 22868 0.1 18553 0.2
     Philippines 14063 0.0 188 0.0 31972 0.5 296 0.0 457 0.0 1160 0.0
     Indonesia 15663 0.0 241 0.0 29983 0.5 2942 0.1 870 0.0 698 0.0
     Malaysia 17478 0.0 3 0.0 73747 1.3 12552 0.5 1439 0.0 320 0.0
     Singapore 234232 0.2 … … 10957 0.2 3763 0.2 8742 0.0 10454 0.1
     Thailand 54895 0.1 2254 0.2 34943 0.6 1081 0.0 3414 0.0 315 0.0
     Taiwan (China) 41020 0.0 19019 1.8 155380 2.7 6832 0.3 20420 0.1 4566 0.1
     Hong Kong (China) 430998 0.5 2432 0.2 54591 0.9 89200 3.7 4911 0.0 42371 0.6
Japan 1355646 1.4 691 0.1 388005 6.6 24908 1.0 144809 0.6 110879 1.5
SOUTH-EAST ASIA+Japan 2355897 2.5 25674 2.5 924711 15.8 152723 6.4 207930 0.9 189316 2.5
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES 62218 0.1 114 0.0 438181 7.5 118799 5.0 3004 0.0 3770 0.1
     Bangladesh 292 0.0 … … 859 0.0 … … 8 0.0 237 0.0
     China 38205 0.0 … … 419383 7.2 116341 4.9 755 0.0 924 0.0
     India 20769 0.0 114 0.0 14962 0.3 2230 0.1 2146 0.0 2382 0.0
     Pakistan 2952 0.0 … … 2977 0.1 228 0.0 95 0.0 227 0.0
OTHER COUNTRIES 93039785 97.5 1017219 97.5 4627225 79.3 2132720 89.0 22483745 99.2 7253846 97.5
TOTAL EXPORTS 95457900 100.0 1043007 100.0 5834737 100.0 2397410 100.0 22674259 100.0 7442366 100.0
Source: ECLAC, based on figures from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics .
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Table A-7
SHARE OF ASIAN ECONOMIES IN WORLD IMPORTS OF SELECTED PRODUCT GROUPS
(As a percentage of the world total)
1995 Food Agricultural Fuel    Minerals Manufactures Total Cereals Fertil- Petroleum Textiles Metals and
raw        and      imports izers (inc. fibres) metal
materials      metals manufactures
Japan 11.7 12.4 14.1 11.6 4.7 6.5 9.0 3.1 14.0 7.4 5.2
China 2.0 4.6 1.4 3.0 2.7 2.6 6.3 17.4 1.1 4.5 2.8
Rep. of Korea 1.6 4.8 5.0 4.5 2.3 2.6 3.4 1.2 5.1 1.9 3.3
Philippines 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.6 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.4 0.6
Hong Kong (China) 2.3 2.2 1.0 2.1 4.4 3.8 1.0 0.0 1.6 8.6 2.5
Indonesia 0.8 1.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 2.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 1.0
Malaysia 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.8 0.1 0.6 1.6
Singapore 1.2 0.7 2.6 1.5 2.7 2.4 0.6 0.0 3.0 1.1 1.9
Thailand 0.6 1.9 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.4 0.6 3.0 1.4 0.7 2.4
Taiwan (China) 1.2 2.8 1.9 3.3 2.0 2.0 2.4 0.5 1.8 1.0 3.2
Regional total 22.8 32.2 29.1 30.0 23.2 24.0 28.5 29.1 29.7 26.8 24.5
East and South-East Asia a/ 9.0 15.2 13.7 15.4 15.8 14.9 13.3 8.6 14.6 14.9 16.6
World total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a/ Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan (China), Thailand.
Source: Based on UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1995,  Geneva, 1997.
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Table A-8
STRUCTURE OF ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN EXPORTS
BY PRODUCT AND DESTINATION
1995
(In percentages)
WORLD LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPEAN UNITED JAPAN EAST AND 
THE CARIBBEAN UNION STATES SOUTH -EAST
ASIA
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN a/
Total exports (in millions of dollars) 215234 42028 34710 99448 8713 12121
Food 21,9 19,2 42,3 11,5 28,9 29,4
Agricultural raw materials 3,7 2,8 6,7 2,1 9,7 8,0
Metals and minerals 8,7 5,6 15,8 3,6 41,0 22,2
Fuel 14,5 15,7 7,5 18,6 5,5 3,2
Manufactures 49,5 56,2 24,5 63,1 14,9 36,9
Product total b/ 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA c/
Total exports (in millions of dollars) 789722 18133 107268 147315 117548 304543
Food 8,3 3,4 6,8 3,8 15,0 6,5
Agricultural raw materials 3,1 2,6 3,7 1,6 4,2 3,3
Metals and minerals 3,0 0,3 1,7 0,4 5,4 3,6
Fuel 5,5 2,1 1,3 1,1 12,8 6,5
Manufactures 77,5 88,4 83,7 90,3 59,2 76,3
Product total b/ 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a/  Includes the following 32 countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis,  
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
b/ The sum of the parts may not add up to 100, since some products are excluded.
c/ Includes the following 11 countries or areas: Australia, China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore,
Taiwan (China) and Thailand.
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Table A-9
ASIAN, LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN EXPORTS
TO OECD COUNTRIES, 1995
(10 main products in descending order of importance)
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN a/
1    Petroleum oils, crude, and crude oils obtained from bituminous minerals
2    Coffee and coffee substitutes
3    Fruits and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried
4    Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons
5    Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals)
6   Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals (other than crude)
7    Motor vehicle parts and accessories
8    Equipment for distributing electricity
9   Ores and concentrates of base metals
10   Special transactions and commodities not classified according to kind
 Total of the 10 main products as a percentage of total exports to OECD countries 37%
ASIAN COUNTRIES b/
1    Automatic data processing machines and units thereof
2   Thermionic, cold cathode or photo-cathode valves and tubes
3    Parts and accessories (other than covers, carrying cases and the like) suitable
   for use solely or principally with office machines or
   automatic data processing machines
4    Baby carriages, toys, games and sporting goods
5    Other garments, women's, girls' and infants', of textile fabrics, other than knitted or crocheted
6    Outer garments and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted, not elastic nor rubberized
7    Footwear
8    Telecommunications equipment and parts and accessories for telecommunications and
   sound reproducing apparatus and equipment
9    Radio-broadcast receivers
10    Other garments, men's and boy's, of textile fabrics, other than knitted or crocheted
  Total of the 10 main products as a percentage of total exports to OECD countries 41%
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a/     Includes the following 32 countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
       Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,      
       Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
       Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
b/    Includes the following 11 countries or areas: Australia, China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
       Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.
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Table  A-10
LATIN AMERICA: STOCK EXCHANGE INDEXES, PRICES IN DOLLARS a/
(Indexes; June 1997 = 100)
1996  1997  1998  
December June September October November December January February March
Latin America 72,5 100,0 103,4 83,7 85,9 90,6 80,0 83,7 89,2
Argentina 82,1 100,0 106,4 86,6 91,9 96,3 87,3 94,1 97,9
Brazil 64,9 100,0 94,8 71,4 72,7 78,3 72,6 77,8 84,1
Chile 77,0 100,0 96,4 86,6 81,3 79,6 67,9 74,2 78,6
Colombia 80,5 100,0 107,0 105,5 97,3 99,9 89,5 78,2 76,0
Mexico 77,3 100,0 119,6 96,5 105,1 114,1 96,7 98,8 104,7
Peru 73,6 100,0 92,1 84,6 82,3 83,8 75,2 72,0 78,9
Venezuela 98,9 100,0 115,2 102,0 95,4 93,3 77,6 75,0 77,4
Asia b/ 126,7 100,0 77,4 64,6 57,7 53,9 53,3 62,8 62,4
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the International Finance Corporation.
a/  Values as of the end of each month.  b/  Includes China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.
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Table A-11
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES a/
(Millions of dollars)
 
     
1995 1996 1997 1997 1998
    First quarter Second quarter     Third quarter Fourth quarter First quarter
LATIN AMERICA 23071 47157 54165 11876 18726 19762 3800 13783
Argentina 6354 13738 14791 4218 3038 6063 1471 5612
Barbados - - - - - -                          -  -
Bolivia - - - - - - -  -
Brazil 7041 11194 14722 1992 7056 4237 1437 3920
Chile 300 1750 1700 650 - 1050 - -
Colombia 1083 1751 1000 1000 - - - 889
Ecuador 10 - 625 - 625 - - -
Guatemala - - 150 - - 150 - -
Jamaica - - 200 - 200 - - -
Mexico 7646 17823 13768 3316 6413 3146 892 3362
Panama - 75 1315 500 - 815 - -
Trinidad and Tabago 71 150 - - - - - -
Uruguay 211 145 479 100 79 300 - -
Venezuela 356 532 5415 100 1315 4000 - -
   
Source: International Monetary Fund, Research Department, Emerging Markets Studies Division.
a/ Gross issues. Includes medium-term euronotes.
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Table A-12
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES a/
1995 1996 1997 b/ 1997 1998  
First quarter       Second quarter Third quarter       Fourth quarter c/ First quarter d/  
Maturities (in years)
Latin America 3,7 7,8 15,9 14,4 13,6 18,6 7,6 6,9
Argentina 4,7 9,2 14,3 14,0 7,5 16,8 4,5 9.3 e/
Brazil 2,7 6,5 16,8 8,2 23,5 7,9                  9.2 f/ 4.6 f/
Chile 8,0 7,3 35,6 54,9 - 9,3 - -
Colombia 9,7 6,9 15,0 15,0 - - 5,0 6,5
Ecuador - - 5,0 - 5,0 - - -
Mexico 2,4 7,4 9,5 10,0 7,8 12,3 - 8,7
Panama - - 19,6 5,0 - 30,0 - -
Uruguay - - 30,0 - - 30,0 - -
Venezuela 3,8 7,0 30,0 - 14,8 30,0 - -
Spreads g/
Latin America … 370 288 271 308 286 450 399
Argentina … 383 301 340 264 278 355 416
Brazil … 358 334 227 353 335 515 443
Chile … 86 96 103 - 88 - -
Colombia … 188 140 140 - - 155 290
Ecuador - - 470 - 470 - - -
Mexico … 393 270 298 257 262 - 311
Panama - - 219 175 - 250 - -
Uruguay - - 135 - - 135 - -
Venezuela … 440 325 - 159 325 - -
Source: To the third quarter 1997: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1996  and Financial Flows and the Developing Countries , 
                various issues. From the fourth quarter 1997: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a/ To the third quarter 1997, includes issues of over US$ 150 million.
b/ Includes only the period from January to September.
c/ Includes only issues placed after the Hong Kong stock market crash of 27 October 1997.
d/ Preliminary estimates.
e/ Does not include the US$ 500 million additional global bond issue with a maturity of 29.5 years.
f/ Includes euronotes and certificates of deposit.
g/ Refers to the difference in yield between the bonds issued and United States Treasury bonds of similar maturities (100 basis points = 1% of yield).
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Table A-13
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
(In millions of dollars, at end of each month)
1997 1998
June July August September October November December January February March
ARGENTINA 19740 19644 19832 19364 19604 19956 22320 21167 21654 21213
BOLIVIA 1038 1159 1136 1150 1150 1115 1087 1020 951 938
BRAZIL 56795 59493 62266 61161 52852 51174 51359 52479 57417 67772
CHILE 17598 17488 18010 18130 18865 18823 17841 16831 17048 16937
COLOMBIA 10271 10280 10281 10229 10158 9986 9981 9747 9492 9422
COSTA RICA 1151 1151 1167 1223 1126 1173 1262 … 1141 …
ECUADOR 2286 2167 2101 2257 2142 2125 2093 1954 1970 1940
EL SALVADOR 1136 1154 1182 1126 1241 1226 1463 a/ 1468 a/ 1817 a/ 1859 a/
GUATEMALA 1058 1050 1065 1109 1093 1035 1111 1019 1025 …
HAITI 101 71 62 73 76 73 … … … …
HONDURAS 507 540 544 530 512 488 580 607 672 710 a/
MEXICO 23775 24566 25841 26966 28102 27002 28797 29186 28597 a/ 29422 a/
NICARAGUA 319 286 297 242 303 320 a/ 387 a/ 357 a/ 378 a/ 387 a/
PANAMA 1095 1075 1068 1060 1167 1118 1148 1142 1119 …
PARAGUAY 825 758 738 735 692 639 695 615 609 627
PERU 9674 9769 9874 9768 10186 10202 10169 10192 10169 10248
DOMINICAN REP. 364 375 388 371 339 328 391 201 a/ 188 a/ 217 a/
URUGUAY 1301 1403 1453 1501 1463 1445 1159 b/ 1561 1566 1673
VENEZUELA 16655 16476 18624 18330 18312 18910 17818 17131 17006 15762
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics , various issues, and national sources.
a/ Official figure of the country's central bank.
b/ Adjusted value.
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Table A-14
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE RATES
(National currency to the dollar, at end of each month)
1997 1998
June July August September October November December January February March a/
ARGENTINA 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
BOLIVIA 5,23 5,25 5,27 5,29 5,32 5,34 5,37 5,39 5,41 5,45
BRAZIL 1,08 1,08 1,09 1,10 1,10 1,11 1,12 1,13 1,14 1,14
CHILE 416,17 416,78 414,73 415,20 420,87 435,41 439,81 453,39 452,00 452,40
COLOMBIA 1090,58 1109,65 1167,28 1246,27 1281,20 1303,10 1293,58 1338,50 1344,25 1365,66
COSTA RICA 232,85 234,89 236,71 238,61 240,74 242,49 244,53 245,60 248,22 250,13
ECUADOR 3989,00 4045,00 4108,00 4142,00 4260,00 4329,00 4428,00 4527,50 4570,00 4930,00
EL SALVADOR 8,76 8,76 8,76 8,76 8,76 8,76 8,76 8,76 8,76 8,79
GUATEMALA 5,90 6,05 6,08 6,14 6,20 6,24 6,18 6,26 6,21 6,32
HAITI 16,76 16,49 16,75 16,70 17,48 17,91 16,77 17,22 17,30 17,40
HONDURAS 13,07 13,08 13,08 13,09 13,09 13,09 13,25 13,20 13,25 13,35
MEXICO 7,96 7,81 7,75 7,82 8,10 8,20 8,14 8,40 8,57 8,52
NICARAGUA 9,44 9,53 9,62 9,71 9,81 9,93 9,99 10,08 10,20 10,26
PANAMA 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
PARAGUAY 2176,40 2190,00 2195,00 2210,00 2230,00 2260,00 2450,00 2475,00 2560,00 2580,00
PERU 2,65 2,66 2,65 2,65 2,71 2,72 2,76 2,80 2,86 2,85
DOMINICAN REP. 14,02 14,10 14,21 14,26 14,42 14,34 14,37 14,57 14,73 14,68
URUGUAY 9,49 9,60 9,71 9,74 9,91 9,92 10,07 10,09 10,15 10,24
VENEZUELA 485,75 497,00 496,50 497,75 500,00 500,75 504,25 510,50 517,00 523,50
Source: International Monetary Fund and national sources.
a/ Data as of  27.03.98.
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Table A-15
LATIN AMERICA: DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES, ANNUALIZED
( In percentages)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Mexico Peru
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1997 Jan 7.9 22.4 … 6.9 26.5 24.8 23.6 14.6
Feb 9.1 21.8 … 6.8 25.4 27.5 19.8 …
Mar 8.4 21.3 … 6.6 25.4 24.4 21.7 …
Apr 8.1 20.7 … 6.5 24.7 24.7 21.4 14.8
May 7.9 20.7 … 6.5 23.6 24.4 18.4 …
Jun 7.1 20.7 … 6.3 23.2 24.3 20.2 12.3
Jul 8.0 20.7 12.5 6.4 23.2 23.4 18.8 20.8
Aug 9.9 20.7 13.8 6.3 23.0 24.7 18.9 12.0
Sep 7.2 20.7 13.5 6.2 22.8 26.6 18.0 13.8
Oct 12.4 21.6 14.8 6.2 23.2 26.8 17.9 12.0
Nov 13.5 43.4 13.0 6.2 24.1 28.1 20.2 13.5
Dic 11.7 11.3 40.9 10.6 6.5 24.3 27.9 18.9 …
1998 Jan 9.8 8.1 37.7 19.2 7.8 24.6 28.6 18.0 14.0
Feb  8.2 34.5 18.2 8.2 25.0 30.7 19.5 13.9
Mar 7.6 28.0 14.4 8.0 27.9 33.8 21.1 …
Argentina (1): Peso interbank rates, more than 15 days.
Argentina (2):    30-day peso interbank rates (BAIBOR).
Brazil: Central bank rates.
Colombia: 90-day certificate of deposit (CDT) rates.
Chile (3): Central Bank 90-day discountable note rates.
Chile (4): Average rates on 90- to 365-day bank deposits in Unidades de Fomento (UF) (Development Units).
Ecuador: 84- or 91-day monetary stabilization bond rates at Central Bank of Ecuador auctions.
Mexico: 28-day treasury certificate (CETES) rates.
Peru: Interest rates on Central Reserve Bank of Peru 4-week certificates of deposit.
Source:
Argentina (1): Ministry of Economic Affairs and Public Works and Services, Department of Economic Policy, on the basis of data of 
the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic.
Argentina (2): Central Bank of the Argentine Republic.
Brazil: Central Bank of Brazil.
Chile (3): Central Bank of Chile.
Chile (4): Central Bank of Chile.
Colombia: Bank of the Republic of Colombia.
Ecuador: Central Bank of Ecuador.
Mexico: Bank of Mexico.
Peru: Central Reserve Bank of Peru, Weekly note.
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Table A-16
.
LATIN AMERICA: BANK DEPOSITS
(Total in millions of units of the national currency, at end of each month)
1997 1998
June July August September October November December January February
ARGENTINA 63030 64570 65525 66161 66909 68916 69732 70844 71553
BOLIVIA 15088 15577 15790 16051 14269 16429 16771 … …
BRAZIL a/ 202475 206973 212262 219813 213138 219555 204395 … …
CHILE 10918 10938 11028 11336 11578 11856 12077 12382 12465
COLOMBIA 16356200 16966800 19248300 19969200 20417300 21602600 22961100 … …
COSTA RICA 594672 … … … … … 633757 … …
ECUADOR 14987 15047 15432 15691 16706 17033 17193 … …
EL SALVADOR 36255 36482 36445 36290 36478 37481 38840 39178 …
GUATEMALA 15200 16185 16500 16559 17229 17662 18048 … …
HAITI 12874 12861 13087 13424 13768 13931 14411 … …
HONDURAS 13942 14625 15141 15731 16267 16781 17993 … …
MEXICO 1027643 1003452 1009339 1021021 1053545 1065642 1125819 1097511 …
NICARAGUA 2690 2783 2907 3004 3107 2965 3031 … …
PANAMA 5503 … … 5631 … … 6028 … …
PARAGUAY 4328609 4073515 4395657 4251454 … … … … …
PERU 30703 30979 31354 31850 32273 32857 33439 … …
DOMINICAN REP. 40166 40512 42326 43451 44499 44910 47963 … …
URUGUAY 57738,6 58295,5 58791 59134 60298 … … … …
VENEZUELA 5807415 6351654 6298788 6569096 6942409 7548080 … … …
Source: Bulletins of the countries' central banks, and other national sources; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics , March 1998.
    
… : No data available.
a/ Does not include two banks from June to August 1997, three banks in September 1997, four banks in October and November 1997 and 22 banks in December 1997.
60 IMPACT OF THE ASIAN CRISIS ON LATIN AMERICA
Table A-17
LATIN AMERICA: EXTERNAL TRADE IN GOODS (FOB) AND CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
(In millions of current dollars)
     1996 1997 1998 ( projected )
EXP. IMP.  BALANCE  BALANCE EXP. IMP.  BALANCE  BALANCE EXP. IMP.  BALANCE  BALANCE
  GOODS  CURR. ACT.   GOODS CURR. ACT.   GOODS  CURR. ACT.
Argentina 23811 22162 1649 -4005 25306 27716 -2410 -9779 26318 30765 -4447 -12819
Bolivia 1073 1292 -219 -443 1115 1545 -430 -570 1166 1823 -657 -739
Brazil 47747 53286 -5539 -24347 52986 61358 -8372 -33439 56430 61972 -5541 -30098
Chile 15353 16500 -1147 -3744 16886 18110 -1224 -4057 17055 19197 -2142 -5040
Colombia 10651 12784 -2133 -4785 11769 13905 -2136 -4873 12828 14461 -1633 -5038
Costa Rica 2739 3127 -388 -149 3053 3641 -588 -422 3358 4314 -956 -680
Ecuador 4900 3680 1220 293 5190 4510 681 -671 5242 5186 56 -1255
El Salvador 1581 3032 -1451 -178 2338 3363 -1026 -70 2630 3935 -1305 -282
Guatemala 2227 2895 -667 -466 2619 3312 -693 -532 2750 3643 -893 -702
Haiti 148 499 -351 -73 194 510 -316 -135 233 522 -289 -129
Honduras 1642 1759 -117 -197 1860 1840 21 31 2013 1977 35 49
Mexico 96000 89469 6531 -1922 110378 109807 571 -7448 124948 129572 -4624 -12613
Nicaragua 675 1052 -377 -497 774 1323 -549 -420 883 1521 -639 -535
Panama 5889 6518 -630 131 6572 7301 -729 -298 7098 7870 -773 -358
Paraguay 2680 4059 -1379 -669 2690 4208 -1518 -824 2676 4376 -1700 -979
Peru 5897 7897 -2000 -3607 6814 8660 -1846 -3390 6678 9266 -2588 -4198
Dominican Rep. 4195 5727 -1532 -110 4802 6608 -1806 -151 5244 7401 -2158 -92
Uruguay 2440 3143 -703 -296 2700 3450 -750 -256 2903 3692 -789 -314
Venezuela 22900 9237 13663 8824 23535 12045 11490 5815 23064 14334 8730 2930
TOTAL 252547 248117 4430 -36240 281581 293211 -11630 -61488 303517 325829 -22312 -72892
Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division, and Economic Development Division.
